## 1AC

### 1AC—Legitimacy

#### CONTENTION 1 IS LEGITIMACY:

#### The embargo damages legitimacy—unilateral removal solves

Parrilla 12 – Bruno Rodriguez is the Cuban Foreign Affairs Minister; this is a transcript of a speech to the UN. (“No legitimate or moral reason to maintain US blockade against Cuba”, November 9, 2012, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C11%5C19%5Cstory\_19-11-2012\_pg7\_15)

Mr President; I would like to reiterate the most heartfelt condolences of the people and government of Cuba to the people of the United States, the city of New York, to populations directly affected and particularly to relatives of the victims, for the loss of human life and the severe material damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. We likewise express our condolences to the peoples and governments of Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and Canada, also affected by the hurricane, as well as to Guatemala and Mexico for the recent earthquake which affected those countries. Mr President; On April 6, 1960, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester D Mallory wrote the most concise, accurate and enduring definition of the blockade of Cuba, and I quote, “To cause disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship [...] to weaken the economic life of Cuba [...] denying money and supplies [...] to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.” So far this has been the vision that has embodied the inhumane, failed and anachronistic policy of 11 successive US governments under which 76% of Cubans have been born. Our country has never been at war with or engaged in any hostile action against the United States. It has never consented to the perpetration of terrorist acts against the American people. In 2008, presidential candidate Obama electrified Americans with his energy, his origins and his words, “Yes, we can.” Three months later, after being elected president, he announced, “a new beginning with Cuba” and stated, and I quote, “We can move US-Cuba relations in a new direction and launch a new chapter of engagement that will be sustained throughout my administration”. However, the reality of the last four years has been characterised by a persistent intensification of the economic, commercial and financial blockade; in particular its extraterritorial dimension, despite the fact that this assembly has approved by a consistent and overwhelming majority, 20 consecutive resolutions calling for an end to this policy. Maintaining this policy in force is not in the national interest of the United States. On the contrary, it is damaging to the interests of its citizens and companies, especially in times of economic crisis and high unemployment. According to every opinion poll, citizens are demanding a change in policy. Why encroach on Americans’ constitutional and civil rights and freedom of travel by preventing them from visiting the island, when they can visit any other part of the planet, including places where their country is waging war? Why renounce a market of 11 million people? Why continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars derived from taxes paid by US citizens on useless and illegal subversion in Cuba? Why damage its relations with other states, including its allies, with extraterritorial measures which violate international law? Why resort to an approach contrary to the one animating its growing economic relations with states that have a different political system? The blockade also damages the legitimate interests of and discriminates against Cuban émigrés settled here in this country, who are overwhelmingly in favour of the normalisation of relations with their nation. It **damages the credibility** of United States foreign policy, **leads to its isolation**, places the country in a **costly situation of double standards**. After 50 years, it has proven its ineffectiveness in pursuit of the ends envisaged and is an insurmountable obstacle in its constantly more uncomfortable relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. If ended, it would save its government from greater discredit to its humanitarian policies and cease being a persistent violation of Cubans’ human rights. The United States could refrain from including our state on spurious lists such as the one classifying it as a sponsor of terrorism, with the sole purpose of justifying additional measures against financial transactions, and which is so damaging to the effectiveness and credibility of the international battle against this terrible scourge. There is no legitimate or moral reason to maintain this blockade that is anchored in the Cold War. It is merely the weapon of an ever more exiguous, isolated, violent and arrogant minority which uses it for electoral profit, is contemptuous of the call of the majority and will not resign itself to the unshakable determination of Cubans to decide their own destiny. Mr President; The use of a less strident and threatening rhetoric and a certain partial relaxation of travel restrictions on residents of Cuban origin and others for academic, scientific or cultural purposes have failed to conceal the intensification of the blockade during the last four years. The UN Secretary General’s report, which includes the contributions of a significant number of delegations and agencies present here, broadly documents the multiple and diverse damages caused both to my country and many of the governments represented here. In November 2011, the Treasury Department fined the New York subsidiary of the German Commerzbank $175, 500 for acting as consultant and guarantor of a Cuban national concerning a payment to a Canadian company. In June 2012, the Department of Justice announced the imposition of a $619 million fine on the Dutch ING bank for alleged violations of the regime of sanctions against Cuba and other countries. This is the largest fine ever imposed on a foreign bank. Referring to this unprecedented event, Mr Adam Szubin, director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), attached to the Treasury Department, stated in a menacing tone, “Our sanctions laws reflect core US national security and foreign policy interests and OFAC polices them aggressively. Today’s historic settlement should serve as a clear warning to anyone who would consider profiting by evading US sanctions.” During President Obama’s administration, fines imposed amount to $2,259,732 billion, double those imposed under both terms of the George W Bush administration. The implementation of the blockade has moved beyond all conceivable limits. In December 2011, the Trinidad and Tobago Hilton Hotel, a national property operating under a management contract with the hotel chain, received categorical orders from OFAC to prevent the 4th CARICOM-Cuba Summit of Heads of State and Government from taking place on its premises, which constituted a real scandal and a disrespectful act toward all the nations of the Caribbean and the international community. In July 2012, two executives from the French subsidiary of the travel agency Carlson Wagonlit Travel (CWT) were sacked for selling tourist packages to Cuba. The company runs the risk of being fined $38,000 for each package sold. On May 10, 2012, not even a year from the issue of the first and very limited licences permitting US citizens to travel to Cuba “for educational purposes and people-to-people exchanges”, the Treasury Department prohibited tours of recreational sites, financial transactions involving tourist activities and established new and stricter measures to ensure that all itineraries and programmes were in accordance with policy on Cuba. At the same time, it was announced that violations of these restrictions would result in fines of $65,000 and the suspension of licences. Mr President; The human damage caused by the blockade is enormous and impossible to calculate. It causes hardship, shortages and difficulties which affect every family, every boy and girl, every man and woman, people with disabilities, senior citizens and medical patients. The William Soler Pediatric Cardio-Centre does not have access to the medicament Levosimendan, used in the treatment of heart problems associated with cardiac output in infants. The hospital is unable to use this medicament; supplies of it have been denied because it is manufactured by Abbott laboratories. The cardiovascular surgery service of the same hospital provides medical treatment of 100-110 infants aged less than 12 months every year. More than 90% of those cases require parenteral nutrition before undergoing surgery with a better prognosis. Our nation has no access to the parenteral food supplements manufactured here in this country, recognised as among the most effective and of highest quality. The impossibility of purchasing laminar tissue for tissue expanders – used in skin transplants – and their necessary acquisition in distant markets at a higher price, complicates and prolongs the treatment of girls and boys with severe burns, with the consequent increase in the length of surgery and hospitalisation of these patients. The pacemaker and electrophysiology service at the Cardiology and Cardiovascular Surgery Institute lacks the non-fluoroscopic three-dimensional mapping equipment used to analyse points of arrhythmia in the human heart, because of the withdrawal of the US firm Saint Jude. This prevents the catheterisation treatment and surgery for curing complex arrhythmias. Consequently, we are forced to send these patients to other countries in order to receive treatment. On the evening of November 6, President Obama spoke of the recovery of the eight-year-old Erin Catherine Potter, a leukemia patient living in Mentor, Ohio. On October 28, 2009, we explained in this hall that Cuban children suffering from lymphoblastic leukemia, and who reject the usual medicaments, cannot be treated with Elspar, the medicament created to treat patients who develop intolerance, because its sale to Cuba by the Merck and Co firm is prohibited. These children also deserve compassion and relief. On October 25, 2012, we also denounced in this same hall that our ophthalmologic services are unable to use transpupillary thermotherapy to treat cancer of the retina (retinoblastoma), which makes it possible to preserve affected eyes in children. Since that date, 15 infants, like Lianna Aguilera Feria, aged one year; María Sánchez Rosales and Rochely Mendoza Rabelo, aged two years; Erika Rodríguez Villavicencio, Fidel Valdés Márquez, Giovanna Álvarez Torrens and Magdiel Leyva Suárez, aged three years, have suffered the loss of their eyes because the government of the United States prevents the purchase of the necessary medical equipment from the American company Iris Medical Instruments. Given its express intention and direct effects, **the blockade of Cuba qualifies as an act of genocide** in accordance with Article 2 (b) and 2 (c) of the 1948 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is a **massive, flagrant and systematic** violation of the human rights of an entire people. We strongly oppose unilateral coercive measures and economic sanctions which only cause harm to human beings. As expressed by the leader of the Revolution at this very podium, “We want a world without hegemonies, without nuclear weapons, without interventions, without racism, without national or religious hatred, without outrages to the sovereignty of any country; a world which respects the independence and free determination of peoples, a world without universal models which totally disregard the traditions and culture of all the components of humankind, and without cruel blockades which kill men, women, children, young people and senior citizens like silent atom bombs.” Mr President; As stated in the Secretary General’s report, the economic damages accumulated during more than 50 years through 2011 amount to $1.066 trillion – more than one trillion dollars – according to rigorous and conservative calculations based on the devaluation of the dollar in relation to the price of gold. Any sensible person can imagine the living standards and development levels we could have achieved if we had been able to count on those resources. The blockade is one of the principal causes of our country’s economic problems and a major obstacle to its economic and social development. It is in violation of international law; it is contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and a violation of a sovereign state’s right to peace and security. It is an act of aggression, a permanent threat to a country’s stability. It is also a gross violation of the regulations governing international trade, freedom of navigation and the sovereign rights of states, given its extraterritorial nature. Given that the blockade is a unilateral policy, it should be lifted unilaterally. Mr President; The US people, towards whom Cuba has sentiments of friendship and respect, have just re-elected President Barack Obama. During his electoral campaign, he repeated dozens of times that he continues to be the “president for change” and that he will continue to “move forward”. President Obama has the opportunity to initiate a new policy towards Cuba, different from that of his 10 predecessors during more than half a century. Certainly, it will be a difficult task and he will confront serious obstacles, but the president has the constitutional powers allowing him to listen to public opinion and generate the necessary dynamic, by means of executive decisions, even without the approval of Congress. Doubtless this **would be a historical legacy**. He would be committing a serious error and making everything all the more difficult for the future if he decides to wait for a new generation of Cuban leaders or for the impossible collapse of our economy. This option would inscribe him in history as the eleventh president to repeat the same mistake.

#### It also makes leadership ineffective—the plan sends the signal that the US is willing to engage with non-democracies

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The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies. In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, **its legitimacy and influence will grow**. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions **knowing that the United States will return in kind**. The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### That’s critical to legitimacy

Kupchan and Mount 09 (Charles, professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Adam, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “The Autonomy Rule,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2009, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/12/Kupchan.pdf>)

Many American strategists recognize the inevitability of a more level global playing field, but they have arrived at an illusory response: that the United States and its democratic allies should dedicate the twilight hours of their primacy to universalizing the Western order. According to G. John Ikenberry, a political scientist at Princeton University, “The United States’ global position may be weakening, but the international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first century.” The West should “sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible” to ensure that the world continues to play by its rules even as its material preponderance wanes. Such confidence in the universality of the Western order is, however, based on wishful thinking about the likely trajectory of ascending powers, which throughout history have sought to adjust the prevailing order in ways that favor their own interests. Presuming that rising states will readily take their seats at the West’s table is unrealistic and even dangerous, promising to alienate emerging powers that will be pivotal to global stability in the years ahead. Instead, the West will have to make room for the competing visions of rising powers and prepare for an international system in which its principles no longer serve as the primary anchor. Sinking the roots of the West, founding a “league of democracies,” and turning NATO into a global alliance of democratic states would be admirable visions in a politically homogeneous world. But the Western model does not command widespread acceptance. If the next international system is to be characterized by norm-governed order rather than competitive anarchy, it will have to be based on great-power consensus and toleration of political diversity rather than Western primacy and the single-minded pursuit of universal democracy. To that end, the United States should take the lead in fashioning a more diverse and inclusive global order. Call it the “Autonomy Rule”: the terms of the next order should be negotiated among all states, be they democratic or not, that provide responsible governance and broadly promote the autonomy and welfare of their citizens. The West will have to give as much as it gets in shaping the world that comes next. This approach does not constitute acquiescence to illiberalism, but rather a more progressive understanding of America’s liberal tradition. Just as it does at home, the United States should welcome diversity abroad, accepting that liberal democracy must compete respectfully in the marketplace of ideas with other types of regimes. Indeed, toleration of reasonably just alternative political systems will promote U.S. interests far more effectively than the hubris of neoconservatism or the narrow idealism of the current liberal consensus. Respect for responsible governments, toleration of political and cultural diversity, balance between global governance and devolution to regional authorities, and a more modest brand of globalization—these are the principles around which the next order is most likely to take shape.

#### Cuba is *uniquely symbolic*

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Bill Clinton and George W. Bush recently had a face-to-face debate in Canada to discuss current affairs. The only Latin American nation mentioned in their conversation? Cuba. In April the heads of state of the Americas met in Trinidad. The central theme? Cuba—the only country not invited to the summit. Last week the Organization of American States (OAS) had a summit in Honduras. What thorny problem dominated the discussions of the foreign-affairs ministers, including Hillary Clinton, who had to divert her attention from the North Korean nuclear test and the crises in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan to travel to the summit of the OAS? Cuba, of course. A few months ago, the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Cuba. The room was overflowing. A few days later it held a far-less-attended meeting. The subject? Brazil. The obsession with Cuba is not exclusively American. It is as intense in Europe. It would be natural to conclude, therefore, that no other Latin American country matters more to the rest of the hemisphere, or indeed to the rest of the world, than Cuba. Unless, of course, one looks at a map—or at some statistics. Brazil occupies almost half of South America's land mass and is the fifth largest country in the world. Its territory is nearly 80 times larger than that of Cuba. More people live in just one Brazilian city, São Paolo, than in all of Cuba. Brazil's economy is the ninth largest in the world and one of the most dynamic—it is also 31 times larger than that of Cuba. Trade between Brazil and the rest of the world is 25 times that of Cuba. There are 10 times as many Brazilians in the military as there are Cubans in the island's armed forces. In global negotiations on the environment, trade, nuclear proliferation, financial regulation, energy and poverty alleviation, Brazil is a major player. Why the Cuba obsession, then? Why is more attention given to this bankrupt Caribbean island than to a continental giant and global player like Brazil? The usual explanation is that Cuba has a **unique symbolic allure**. It is the small country that confronted the U.S. empire and has survived despite the attempts by all U.S. presidents since to subdue its communist government. It is the island with iconic leaders like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, and the Latin American country that in the language of revolutionaries everywhere embodies the struggle of socialist humanism against the materialism of capitalist societies. Cuba is also the small nation that in the past sent its troops to die in faraway lands in Latin America and even Africa fighting for the poor (and to further the interests of the Kremlin, but that's another story). And it is also the country whose progress in health care and education for the majority became the stuff of legend. It is the small country that the United States has unsuccessfully tried to isolate for decades through a variety of means—including an absurd and useless embargo that hurts the United States more than Cuba. The embargo is the perfect example used by anti-Americans everywhere to expose the hypocrisy of a superpower that punishes a small island while cozying to dictators elsewhere.

#### Legitimacy is critical to primacy—prevents blowback

**Finnemore 9** – (Martha Finnemore, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, January 2009, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1)

Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon. One’s ¶ position or power cannot be legitimate in a vacuum. The concept only ¶ has meaning in a particular social context. Actors, even unipoles, cannot create legitimacy unilaterally. Legitimacy can only be given by ¶ others. It is conferred either by peers, as when great powers accept or ¶ reject the actions of another power, or by those upon whom power is ¶ exercised. Reasons to confer legitimacy have varied throughout history. ¶ Tradition, blood, and claims of divine right have all provided reasons to ¶ confer legitimacy, although in contemporary politics conformity with ¶ international norms and law is more inﬂuential in determining which ¶ actors and actions will be accepted as legitimate.9¶ Recognizing the legitimacy of power does not mean these others ¶ necessarily like the powerful or their policies, but it implies at least tacit ¶ acceptance of the social structure in which power is exercised. One may ¶ not like the inequalities of global capitalism but still believe that markets are the only realistic or likely way to organize successful economic ¶ growth. One may not like the P5 vetoes of the Security Council but still ¶ understand that the United Nations cannot exist without this concession to power asymmetries. We can see the importance of legitimacy by ¶ thinking about its absence. Active rejection of social structures and the ¶ withdrawal of recognition of their legitimacy create a crisis. In domestic politics, regimes suffering legitimacy crises face resistance, whether ¶ passive or active and armed. Internationally, systems suffering legitimacy crises tend to be violent and noncooperative. Post-Reformation ¶ Europe might be an example of such a system. Without at least tacit ¶ acceptance of power’s legitimacy, the wheels of international social life ¶ get derailed. Material force alone remains to impose order, and order ¶ creation or maintenance by that means is difﬁcult, even under unipolarity. Successful and stable orders require the grease of some legitimation ¶ structure to persist and prosper.10¶ The social and relational character of legitimacy thus strongly colors ¶ the nature of any unipolar order and the kinds of orders a unipole can ¶ construct. Yes, unipoles can impose their will, but only to an extent. ¶ The willingness of others to recognize the legitimacy of a unipole’s ¶ actions and defer to its wishes or judgment shapes the character of the ¶ order that will emerge. Unipolar power without any underlying legitimacy will have a very particular character. The unipole’s policies will ¶ meet with resistance, either active or passive, at every turn. Cooperation will be induced only through material quid pro quo payoffs. Trust ¶ will be thin to nonexistent. This is obviously an expensive system to run ¶ and few unipoles have tried to do so.¶ More often unipoles attempt to articulate some set of values and ¶ shared interests that induce acquiescence or support from others, thereby legitimating their power and policies. In part this invocation of values may be strategic; acceptance by or overt support from others makes¶ exercise of power by the unipole cheaper and more effective. Smart ¶ leaders know how to “sell” their policies. Wrapping policies in shared ¶ values or interests smoothes the path to policy success by reassuring ¶ skeptics.11 Rhetoric about shared interests in prosperity and economic ¶ growth accompanies efforts to push free trade deals on unwilling partners and publics. Rhetoric about shared love of human rights and democracy accompanies pushes for political reforms in other states.¶ In their examination of debates leading up to the 2003 Iraq war ¶ in this issue of World Politics, Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli ¶ Bloch-Elkon provide an example of unipolar attempts to create legitimacy through strategic use of rhetoric. They show how “evocative and ¶ evasive rhetoric” allowed proponents of the war to imply links between ¶ the 9/11 attacks, weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein’s ¶ regime. Potentially unpopular or controversial policies were rationalized by situating them in a larger strategic vision built on more widely ¶ held values, as when the authors of the 2002 National Security Strategy ¶ memorandum wove together the global war on terror, the promotion of ¶ American democratic values abroad, and the struggle against authoritarian regimes to create a justiﬁcation for preventive war.12 Indeed, as ¶ Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson argue, rhetorical “sales pitches” of ¶ this kind can be highly coercive. Examining the same case (the selling ¶ of the Iraq war), Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz show how the administration’s “war-on-terror” discourse, which cast the U.S. as a blameless ¶ victim (attacked for “who we are” rather than anything we did), was ¶ designed in such a way as to leave opponents with very few arguments ¶ they could use to rally effective opposition in Congress.13¶ Usually this articulation of values is not simply a strategic ploy. Decision makers and publics in the unipole actually hold these values and ¶ believe their own rhetoric to some signiﬁcant degree. Unipole states, ¶ like all states, are social creatures. They are composed of domestic societies that cohere around some set of national beliefs. Their leaders are¶ products of those societies and often share those beliefs. Even where ¶ leaders may be skeptical, they likely became leaders by virtue of their ¶ abilities to rally publics around shared goals and to construct foreign ¶ and domestic policies that reﬂect domestic values. Even authoritarian ¶ (and certainly totalitarian) regimes articulate shared goals and function ¶ only because of the web of social ties that knit people together. Certainly ¶ all recent and contemporary strong states that could be candidates for ¶ unipoles—the U.S., China, Russia, Germany, and Britain—do.14¶ Thus unipole states, like all states, ﬁnd naked self-aggrandizement ¶ or even the prescriptions of Machiavellian virtú difﬁcult to pursue.15¶ Unipoles and the people who lead them pursue a variety of goals derived from many different values. Even “national interest” as most ¶ people and states conceive of it involves some broader vision of social ¶ good beyond mere self-aggrandizement. Americans like to see democracy spread around the world in part for instrumental reasons—they ¶ believe a world of democracies is a safer, more prosperous world for ¶ Americans—and also for normative ones—they believe in the virtues ¶ of democracy for all. Likewise, Americans like to see markets open ¶ in part for instrumental reasons—they believe a world of markets will ¶ make Americans richer—and also for normative ones—they believe ¶ that markets are the ticket out of poverty.¶ Much of unipolar politics is thus likely to revolve around the degree ¶ to which policies promoting the unipole’s goals are accepted or resisted ¶ by others. Other states and foreign publics may need to be persuaded, ¶ but often inﬂuential domestic constituencies must also be brought on ¶ board. Channels for such persuasion are many and varied, as is evident ¶ from past U.S. diplomatic efforts to sell its policies under bipolarity. ¶ The shift from laissez-faire to what John Ruggie terms the “embedded ¶ liberal compromise” as the basis for the U.S.-led economic order after ¶ WWII required extensive diplomatic effort to persuade other states ¶ and New York’s ﬁnancial elite to go along. The tools of inﬂuence used ¶ to accomplish this were sometimes material but also intellectual and ¶ ideological. It was the “shared social purposes” of these economic arrangements that gave them legitimacy among both state and societal ¶ actors cross-nationally.16¶ A unipole’s policies are thus circumscribed on two fronts. The policies must reﬂect values held at home, making them legitimate domestically. At the same time, in order to induce acquiescence or support ¶ from abroad, they must appeal to the leaders and publics of other states. ¶ Constructing policies across these two spheres—domestic and international—may be more or less difﬁcult, depending on circumstances, ¶ but the range of choices satisfying both constituencies is unlikely to be ¶ large. Widespread disaffection on either front is likely to create signiﬁ-¶ cant legitimacy costs to leaders, either as electoral or stability threats ¶ domestically or as decreased cooperation and increased resistance internationally.¶ Creating legitimacy for its policies is thus essential for the unipole ¶ but it is also difﬁcult, dangerous, and prone to unforeseen consequences. Domestically, the need to cement winning coalitions in place has ¶ polarized U.S. politics, creating incentives to exploit wedge issues and ¶ ideological narratives. As Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon describe, ¶ neoconservatives, particularly after 9/11, used these tools to great effect ¶ to generate support for the Bush administration’s policies. Such ideologically-driven persuasion efforts entail risks, however. Constructing ¶ coherent ideological narratives often involves sidelining inconvenient ¶ facts, what Snyder and his coauthors call “fact bulldozing.” This is more ¶ than just highlighting some facts at the expense of others. It may (or ¶ may not) begin with that aim, but it can also involve changing the facts ¶ people believe to be true, as when large numbers of people came to ¶ believe that weapons of mass destruction were indeed found in Iraq. ¶ Thus, to the degree that these persuasion efforts are successful, if their ¶ ideology does not allow them to entertain contrary facts, policymakers ¶ and publics may make decisions based on bad information. This kind ¶ of self-delusion would seem unlikely to result in smart policy. To the ¶ extent that ideological narratives become entrenched, these delusions ¶ may extend to future generations of policymakers and make them victims of blowback. Even if successors come to terms with the facts, they ¶ may be entrapped by the powerful legitimating rhetoric constructed by ¶ their predecessors.17¶ Internationally, this need to construct legitimate policies also creates ¶ important opportunities for opponents and potential challengers to a¶ unipole. As Stephen Walt notes in this issue, opportunities for conventional material balancing are limited under our current unipolar situation and, by deﬁnition, one would expect this to be so in most, if not all, ¶ unipolar systems. What is a challenger to do? With material balancing ¶ options limited, one obvious opening for rival states is to undermine ¶ the legitimacy of unipolar power. A creative rival who cannot match or ¶ balance a unipole’s military or economic strength can easily ﬁnd strategies to undercut the credibility and integrity of the unipole and to ¶ concoct alternative values or political visions that other states may ﬁnd ¶ more attractive. Thus, even as a unipole struggles to construct political programs that will attract both domestic and international support ¶ with an ideology or values that have wide appeal, others may be trying ¶ to paint those same programs as self-aggrandizing or selﬁsh.¶ Attacks on legitimacy are important “weapons of the weak.”18 Even ¶ actors with limited or no material capability can mount damaging attacks on the credibility, reputation, and legitimacy of the powerful. The ¶ tools to mount such attacks are not hard to come by in contemporary ¶ politics. Information and the ability to disseminate it strategically are ¶ the most potent weapons for delegitimating power in all kinds of situations, domestic and international. Even non-state actors like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activist networks whose material ¶ capabilities are negligible in the terms used in this article have been ¶ able to challenge the legitimacy of policies of powerful states and the ¶ legitimacy of the states themselves. The International Campaign to ¶ Ban Landmines (ICBL) is one prominent example. Civil society groups ¶ and like-minded states were able to attract signatures from more than ¶ 120 governments to ban these devices in 1997 despite opposition from ¶ the unipole (U.S.) government. The fact that the ICBL received the ¶ Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts is suggestive of its success at delegitimating unipole policies on this issue. If legitimacy were irrelevant, ¶ the U.S. would have ignored this challenge; it did not. The Pentagon ¶ has begun phasing out these weapons and replacing them with newer, ¶ more expensive devices meant to conform to the treaty requirements. ¶ Indeed, that the U.S. began touting the superiority of its new mine ¶ policy (promulgated in February 2004) over the ICBL’s Ottawa treaty ¶ requirements highlights the power of this transnational civil society ¶ network to set standards for legitimate behavior in this area.19 Similar ¶ cases of NGO pressure on environmental protection (including climate ¶ change), human rights, weapons taboos, and democratization amply ¶ suggest that this ability to change what is “legitimate” is a common and ¶ consequential way to challenge unipoles.20 The fact that these challenges are mounted on two fronts—international pressure from foreign ¶ governments, international organizations, and NGO activists on the one ¶ hand, and domestic pressure from the unipole’s own citizens who support the activists’ views on the other—makes these challenges doubly ¶ difﬁcult to manage.¶ State actors, too, can use these weapons to attack the unipole’s policies and do so regularly. Among states, attempts to delegitimate the ¶ policies of others are a staple of foreign policy-making and may be ¶ employed more often in states that have fewer material capabilities ¶ with which to achieve their goals against a unipole. France may be unable to balance effectively against U.S. material power in contemporary ¶ politics, but it can (and has) raised questions about U.S. leadership and ¶ the legitimacy of U.S. policies, especially U.S. inclinations toward unilateralism. Exploiting multilateralism’s legitimacy as a form of action, ¶ French attempts since the late 1990s to label the U.S. a “hyperpower” ¶ and to promote a more multilateral, even multipolar, vision of world ¶ politics are clearly designed to constrain the U.S. by undermining the ¶ legitimacy of any U.S. action that does not receive widespread international support and meet international standards for “multilateralism.”21¶ Countering such attacks on legitimacy is neither easy nor costless. It ¶ requires constant management of the transnational conversation sur-¶ rounding the unipole’s behavior and continuing demonstrations of the ¶ unipole’s commitment to the values or vision that legitimate its power. ¶ To simply dismiss or ignore these attacks is dangerous; it smacks of ¶ contempt. It says to others, “You are not even worth my time and attention.” A unipole need not cater to the wishes of the less powerful ¶ to avoid conveying contempt. It can argue, justify, and respectfully disagree—but all of these take time, attention, and diplomacy. Dismissal ¶ is very different than disagreement, however. Peers disagree and argue; ¶ subordinates and servants are dismissed. By treating the less powerful ¶ with contempt the unipole communicates that it does not care about ¶ their views and, ultimately, does not care about the legitimacy of its own ¶ power. To dismiss or ignore the views of the less capable is a form of selfdelegitimation. Contempt is thus a self-defeating strategy for unipoles; ¶ by thumbing its metaphorical nose at others, the unipole undercuts the ¶ legitimacy needed to create a wide range of policy outcomes.22¶ Social control is never absolute and material power alone cannot create it. Effective and long-lasting social control requires some amount ¶ of recognition, deference, and, preferably, acceptance on the part of ¶ those over whom power is exercised. Other parties, not the unipole, ¶ thus hold important keys to the establishment of effective and stable ¶ order under unipolarity. Paradoxically, then, preponderant power can ¶ only be converted into social control if it is diffused. To exercise power ¶ to maximum effect, unipoles must give up some of that power to secure ¶ legitimacy for their policies.

#### Legitimacy theory is true and key to foster cooperation

Gibler 08 – Douglas M Gibler, Department of Political Science University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. (“The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3, June, pp. 426-454)

More sophisticated treatments of the reputation logic have been produced by formal theorists, both in economics and in political science. In economics, the ability of firm reputation to deter competition has been well analyzed (see Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Wilson, 1989; and Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), and political scientists have adopted these theories as tools in understanding the types of signals leaders can send (see for example, Alt, Calvert, and Humes, 1988; Ordeshook, 1986; and Wagner, 1992). Sartori (2002) and Guisinger and Smith (2002) probably go furthest in arguing that leaders and their envoys have incentives to develop certain types of reputations in order to overcome the uncertainty **endemic** to crisis diplomacy. In these models, a reputation for honesty allows the sender to credibly give information that would otherwise be “cheap talk”, and thus, leaders may concede less important issues, without bluffing, in order to maintain a reputation for honesty when more important issues arise (Sartori, 2002: 122).¶ The sum argument of these statements and theoretical treatments is clear. Decision-makers argue and act, at least in part, based on reputations. Traditional deterrence theory suggests reputations should be pursued by leaders as important and manipulable tools, which are useful in future crises. Formal theorists agree; reputations provide valuable information when the costs of signaling are low.

#### Primacy fosters liberalization and stability—collapse causes great power war

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 Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### The world is *on balance better* because of hegemony

**Owen 11** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

### 1AC—Plan Text

#### The United States federal government should allow normal trade between the United States and Cuba.

### 1AC—Agriculture

**CONTENTION 2 IS SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE:**

**Cuban agriculture sustainability is failing—foreign investment is key**

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Cuba needed an alternative agricultural model when foreign oil imports were cut off significantly at the end of the 1980s, and the partial opening of the Cuban economy, focused on creating more autonomous agricultural cooperatives, in the 1990s helped diversity food crops and set Cuba along a path of increased food security. The Cuban model was initiated out of necessity, not because of any sort of Cuban environmental consciousness, yet better environmental conditions went hand in hand with the new development strategy. Cuba learned the limits of their agricultural model under their socialist economic system and it is in need of further transformation in both the agriculture and energy sectors. A further opening of the economy to joint ventures could help with updating the power grid and providing more sources of renewable energy – potentially expanding Cuba’s potential for a more sustainable means of energy security. Further, Cuba needs foreign investment to update agriculture facilities and take maximum advantage of cogeneration and biofuel potential with sugarcane waste. The strong state control of farming practices, used to successfully jumpstart the alternative model, has hit its limit. The Cuban government must begin loosening its grips on the domestic economy to allow for more competition in the farming sector. Despite the potential to become more sustainable with a purposive and focused opening of the economy, the recent surge in joint venture investment on expanding domestic oil extraction, petrochemical facilities, and oil refinery infrastructure reveals a trend toward decreasing environmental sustainability. Once heralded as the world’s most sustainable country by coupling environmental performance indicators with their human development scores, Cuba is slipping further away from this goal. Perhaps the most distressing part of this current trend is that it took Cuba decades to create a national identity that embraced sustainable environmental practices in both the energy and agricultural sector, and it seemingly took only a couple of years to derail these efforts. Undoubtedly, conservation efforts and sustainable education programs can only satiate citizen’s energy desires to a certain point. In order to further the quality of life in the country, electric production must increase to rural areas with little energy infrastructure and to Havana in order to spur foreign investment and domestic small business growth. Cuba’s trade agreement with Venezuela is bringing in much-needed petroleum for electricity production, but their dependence on a relatively unstable country for crude is trapping them into the same relationship that crippled their economy in 1990 – impairing their original goal of self-sufficiency. Cuba is at a turning point in their path toward environmental sustainability, and the current need for immediate foreign capital and increased energy production seem to be trumping its desire to achieve development sustainably. Cuba still has enough centralized control to leap-frog dirty electric production for cleaner renewable forms of energy and the potential to guide development strategies that emphasize investments in and research on renewable energy. It can utilize its expertise on organic farming strategies to increase sugar production in a much more ecologically friendly manner than their monoculture approach in the 1970s and 80s. Decisions made in the next five years will demonstrate whether Cuba embraces their newly created national identity as a society striving for sustainable development or rejects the goal of sustainable development to increase short-term capital and energy needs.

**The plan provides foreign capital to Cuba and allows its model to be exported globally**

Shkolnick 12 – JD Candidate, Drake University Law School. (“SIN EMBARGO: THE CUBAN AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES”, 17 Drake J. Agric. L. 683, Fall, http://students.law.drake.edu/aglawjournal/docs/agVol17No3-Shkolnick.pdf)

Cuba today is experiencing the most rapid shifts towards privatization and reform since the revolution more than sixty years ago. Though truly open trade with Cuba will remain out of reach until the embargo is relaxed or a new trade agreement is reached, it is worth the time of agricultural and business entities in the United States to consider how they may approach doing business in Cuba. Given the extent of pre-embargo trade between the United States and Cuba it is no stretch to imagine the enormous possibilities once that partnership is reestablished. Though reforms over the past decade have made significant progress towards this end, they only scratch the surface on what Cuba has to offer. The two economic areas where Cuba shows perhaps the most promise and have the greatest potential for international trade and investment are tourism and agriculture. Tourism shows great promise simply for the fact that for more than half a century the country has been entirely cut off from open trade and travel by U.S. citizens, citizens who will likely flock to the country once access is restored. Agriculture in Cuba also presents numerous unique opportunities, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union the country has developed novel agricultural production techniques that could help serve a growing demand for natural, organic foods in the United States. While tourism may increase economic opportunity for existing businesses and industries, Cuba’s agricultural model, on the other hand, presents unique opportunities to both existing and entirely new busi-ness opportunities in the United States. A. Cuba as a Tourist Destination Prior to the embargo, Cuba was a travel destination for as many as 300,000 American tourists per year.91 Tourists from various Soviet Bloc nations never came close to making up this loss in travel, reaching no more than 30,000tourists per year.92 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, however, tourism to the island has continued to increase dramatically. As of July 2012, Cuba is the sec-ond most popular tourist destination in the Caribbean region, trailing only the Dominican Republic.93 Slightly more than two million tourists per year now visit the island as of 2011, representing growth of 7.3% over the last year alone.94 Asof 2005, Cuba’s service sector accounted for 67.8% of the nation’s annual gross domestic product, eclipsing traditional Cuban exports such as nickel and sugar.95Tourist infrastructure in Cuba, however, has strained to accommodate the rapid surge in visitors, with hotels, resorts, restaurants, and other accommodations showing their age after decades of relatively little improvement or investment.96Depending on the precise means through which the travel and economic embargos are lifted, estimates of the number of U.S. visitors expected to visit Cuba within the first year range from six hundred thousand to more than one million, with up to five million visitors per year by the fifth year of open travel.97 There is the potential for modest yet not insignificant job growth in response to new travel opportunities, with potentially over twelve thousand new service sector and trav-el jobs in the United States within five years.98B. Agricultural Trade with Cuba It is the agricultural sector, however, that provides some of the most substantial and intriguing opportunities for both trade with Cuba and the creation of entirely new businesses in the United States. In fact, agricultural products were the very first items traded between the United States and Cuba since the embargo in December of 2001, when two ships loaded with chicken and corn arrived inHavana.99 The potential for the U.S. agricultural sector is abundantly clear when the sheer volume of Cuba’s agricultural imports are taken into account. In 2008,Cuba imported approximately $1.8 billion in agricultural goods.100 Only approximately 40% of imported agricultural goods were from the United States, leaving over $1 billion of trade going to other countries.101Cuba itself is very much in favor of increased agricultural trade with the United States simply for the logistical simplicity and cost-savings it would pro-vide.102 Import costs account for as much as 35% of the goods Cuba currently imports from its trading partners.103 Because Cuba is less than one hundred miles from the coast of the United States, the country is naturally eager to enter into trade relationships that lead to lower transportation costs.104 Cuban officials cite rice as just one example of an agricultural product that they would be inter-ested in obtaining from the United States.106 Rice is a staple food for Cuban citizens, and they enjoy it with almost every meal.107 Presently, the bulk of their rice must be imported from Eastern Asia, meaning a long voyage by sea and the expenses that go along with shipping tons of goods across the Pacific Ocean.108Rice exports alone present an enormous opportunity for U.S. producers. The United States is a major exporter of both processed and unprocessed rice, accounting for 10% of all international trade in rice each year.109 Half of annual U.S. rice sales come from the export market, and the United States is considered a reliable supplier of a quality product on the international market.110 The USDA estimates that if the current restrictions on trade were removed, Cuba could potentially exceed Mexico and Japan as the biggest importer of rice grown in the United States.111 As of September 2005, Cuba estimated that they could purchase more than one million metric tons of rice annually, but restrictions make it unlikely that import from the United States will go much beyond current levels of 712,000 metric tons.112 A key obstacle, according to Cuba, is the requirement that all shipments of agricultural products from the United States be paid for in cash before they leave port.113 This resulted in a reduction in rice ex-ports to Cuba by nearly 50% from 2004 to 2005, according to the USA Rice Fed-eration.114 For the foreseeable future, any effort by agricultural groups in the United States to take advantage of trade opportunities with Cuba will have to operate within the guidelines and policy directives of Cuba as well as the United States. One risk that any organization that wishes to trade with Cuba might encounter is that their proposals and business plans will run into red tape not only through regulations in the United States, but through conflict with the Communist Party of Cuba, which still holds tremendous sway over policy and business decisions on the island. Cuban officials are, of course, aware of the tremendous opportunity that trade with the United States might bring to their country, and for the most part remain eager to pursue closer ties with whom they see as their closest, most natu-ral trading partner.115 Roy Ramón Philippón, a leading official with the Cuban Society of Agrarian Law, indicated that the country recognizes that changes are necessary in order to properly compete with and participate in an open globalmarket.116 Long gone are the days when Cuba could count on highly subsidized exports to the Soviet Bloc as a stable source of income.117 For the first forty years of Cuba’s “socialist experiment” following their revolution, the first priority for the Cuban government was to provide the maximum amount of social services and benefit to the population regardless of the cost; something that they could achieve through trade with the Soviet Bloc prior to its collapse.118The process of reform in Cuba is necessarily dependent upon the approv-al of the national Communist Party. All of the reforms that have been put in place must be considered by and ultimately recommended by the Communist Party operating under their internal guidelines.119 By its nature this is intended to be a slow, deliberative process, the intent of which is to allow all interested gov-ernment officials, business representatives, and interested citizens to voice their opinions and for the Party’s guidelines to take each group’s concerns into ac-count.120Cuba has continued to introduce new programs to assist local producers in becoming more productive while also promoting ecological restoration andpreservation.121 In a shift away from the large state-run farms that characterized Cuban agriculture for much of the twentieth century, Cuba is now focused on diversifying agricultural production through a variety of both privately run and some state-controlled enterprises.122Cuban officials responsible for investigating and recommending addi-tional improvements to the Cuban agricultural system echo this call for reform and increased efficiency and productivity.123 Cuban officials point to the two primary goals that Cuba is pursuing in its efforts to improve its agricultural out-put and modernize their agricultural system; eco-restoration and preservation and urban and suburban agriculture.124 In addition, while the country is desirous of increasing its agricultural exports as a source of income, enough of the goods produced must be funneled into an official state-controlled market that can con-trol prices and ensure that food is affordable even to those with low incomes.125The first priority before any additional exports can be considered is to increase production for local consumption to the point where the country could conceiva-bly become self-sustaining for the majority of its food production needs.126 Once they are producing enough food for local consumption, then priorities may shift towards producing additional crops for export; coffee in particular is one locally produced crop that Cuba is particularly interested in increasing production for both local consumption and export.127Government officials recognize that the Cuban economy is in a relatively underdeveloped state, and future policies will need to be responsive to the state’s economic needs as well as their agricultural ones.128 If, for example, the price of corn were to skyrocket on the world market, Cuban officials indicate that if it made economic sense, they **“would cover this island with corn.**”129 Similar to the practices of the former Soviet Bloc, the Cuban economy is still very much orga-nized and planned by the state, and the current agricultural plan in Cuba is de-signed to cover the next five years of anticipated growth.130As for direct investment by foreign investors and producers, current poli-cies in Cuba will make that somewhat difficult for the foreseeable future, as all direct business relationships with foreign entities are currently organized and controlled by a number of governmental bodies.131 Cuban officials indicate that future reforms could conceivably open the door to direct investment and transac-tions between Cuban agricultural producers and foreign buyers.132 Understanding this future opportunity first requires a digression into the organizational structure employed in Cuba to manage and direct the agricultural system in Cuba. V. NEW REFORMS The current agricultural system has gone through a period of significant readjustment since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1993, Cuba started to move away from enormous state-run facilities and fully embraced a model of cooperative ownership that it had first introduced in the 1970s with the cooperativa de producción agropecuaria, or CPA.133 The new model, the basic unit of cooperative production, or UBPC, was introduced in September of 1993,and by 1995 there were 2855 UBPCs in operation.134 The UBPC differs from the CPA in that a UBPC operates on land that continues to be owned by the state but is provided to farmers in the form of a usufruct agreement, while a CPA is made up of lands that groups of farmers already had in their possession.135 By the endof 2007, the UBPC had far exceeded the CPA in the amount of land being farmed, with more than 2.8 million hectares of land organized under the UBPC system, compared to just under 700,000 hectares in CPAs.136 The majority of farmland in Cuba remained under state control as of the end of 2007, with more than 6 million hectares of farmland overseen by the state.137Both the UBPCs and the CPAs operate under an arrangement whereby the state provides assistance in the form of access to credit and a market for the goods produced, and in exchange the production cooperatives provide a certain quota of goods for sale and distribution by the state.138 One of the key objectives in the legislation itself is that the farms shall “be owners of the means of produc-tion and of the crop,” while still retaining ownership of the land in state hands.139Goals of this new organization were to improve efficiency and encourage more productive use of land. The goals of the Cuban Revolution continue to be em-bodied in the legislation that created these entities.140In 2008, Cuba passed what is perhaps the most substantial piece of agri-cultural legislation in decades. Named simply “Law 259,” it provides a means for almost any Cuban citizen, existing farm, or authorized agency to acquire un-used state lands and put them to better use as farmland.141 This is a substantial departure from the earlier CPA and UBCP systems that for the most part only transferred existing agricultural land controlled by the state into quasi-privatecooperatives.142 Law 259 continues the usufruct method of land distribution pio-neered by the UBPC system and allows for any interested, qualified party to ap-ply for an initial tract of a maximum of 13.42 hectares (33.16 acres), with their ownership potentially increasing to up to 40.26 hectares (99.48 acres) in the fu-ture.143 Continued operation of farmland granted under this program is contin-gent upon the land being used in a productive, sustainable manner with appropri-ate environmental conservation measures.144Even with the new reforms, the land is still technically tied to the state, and individuals who take possession of land under this program are not permitted to sell or rent the land to others, though the state will compensate landowners for the improvements they have made to the land during their term of tenancy.145The CPA, UBPC, and now Law 259 reforms Cuba put in place, along with reforms the Cuban government is discussing for the future, mean that opportunities for further U.S. involvement in Cuban agriculture are numerous. Presently, foreign companies that wish to enter into business relation-ships with Cuban counterparts must do so almost entirely via official government channels.146 Government agencies such as the Ministry of Sugar or the Ministry of Agriculture are responsible for managing trade for their respective indus-tries.147 All imports of food and other agricultural products must first enter the country via Alimport, a state-run agency that handles the entire sales process from securing contracts and arranging for payment to managing the distributionprocess.148 For the time being, the sole agency that U.S. companies wishing to engage in agricultural trade in Cuba can work with is Alimport.149 Rarely will there be any contact directly between U.S. companies and end-users in Cuba.150The process in the United States can be similarly convoluted. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security oversees all busi-ness negotiations with Cuban companies, and notifications of sales must be sub-mitted through them before a license will be granted.151 Since U.S. policy still prohibits the extension of credit to any Cuban banks, all payments either have tobe paid for in cash prior to shipment or a confirmed letter-of-credit can be com-pleted with a bank located in a third country.152 In an unusual and unfortunate overlap in U.S. policy directives, goods that are paid for in cash prior to shipment are legally Cuban property though still in the United States, and potentially sub-ject to seizure on behalf of Cuban exiles within the United States who have out-standing legal and monetary claims against the Cuban government.153 Ships with goods meant for Cuba, however, may leave port as soon as payment is either received in cash or confirmed deposited in a foreign bank, a clarification made by the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control in July 2005 in an attempt to reduce anxiety over this possibility.154José Garea Alonso, an official with the Cuban Ministry of Agriculture, indicated that recent legislation such as Law 259 is the start of what may eventu-ally lead to more direct commercial ties between Cuban organizations and foreign buyers or investors.155 At the moment, Cuba’s agricultural cooperatives are relatively small and continue to rely on the state for the bulk of their marketingopportunities.156 In the future, these cooperatives may be allowed to join together to form larger groups of linked agricultural cooperatives working together to manage their own affairs, and may include the ability to directly negotiate with foreign buyers rather than requiring an intervening hand from Alimport or anoth-er appropriate ministry.157Foreign investment in Cuban businesses has only been possible in a lim-ited form since the early 1980s, when the Cuban government introduced legisla-tion allowing for foreign entities to create a joint venture with the Cuban gov-ernment for investment purposes.158 Ultimately, the goal of this legislation was to provide an easier means for Cuba to acquire additional foreign currency to inject into its economy.159 Even with the new law, regulations prohibited any foreign participant in a joint enterprise from controlling more than 49%, though such a restriction was not in place for a partnership.160VI. NEW OPPORTUNITIES While investment in Cuban businesses and sales or purchases of Cuban products must still move through official channels under the joint venture law or other Cuban programs, the time is ripe for organizations in the United States to begin laying groundwork for closer ties with Cuban agricultural entities. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future trade opportunities.161As previously mentioned, recent changes in U.S. policy now allow for any individual in the United States, not simply relatives, to donate money to Cu-ban citizens, though not to exceed $500 for any three month consecutive period, with the only restriction being that the recipient is not an official in the Cuban government or the Communist Party.162 Specifically written into these new regu-lations is the idea that these remittances may be spent “to support the develop-ment of private businesses.”163 A five hundred dollar infusion of capital to sup-port a fledging business or farm can be enormously beneficial when the average monthly salary is only 448 pesos, or approximately twenty dollars.164Additional capital will enable small Cuban farms to expand operations by hiring additional help or perhaps purchasing additional farm animals. While purchasing a tractor may seem like an obvious choice for a growing farm, Medardo Naranjo Valdes of the Organoponico Vivero Alamar, a UBPC just out-side of Havana, indicated that farm animals such as oxen would remain the pre-ferred choice for the foreseeable future on the small and midsized farms that make up the majority of the newer agricultural cooperatives.165 Not only do farm animals not require gasoline or incur maintenance costs beyond perhaps an occa-sional veterinarian charge, their waste can be used as fertilizer. Apart from additional labor, funds provided to agricultural cooperatives could be put to use in developing innovative pest control techniques that do not require the use of expensive pesticides or other chemicals. The Vivero Alamar is currently experimenting with a variety of natural pest control techniques such as introducing plants that serve as natural repellents to insects and the introduction of other insects that feed on harmful pests without harming the crops.166Investment in agricultural cooperatives done in this manner will likely fail to see much return on the investment for their foreseeable future, until poli-cies in both the United States and Cuba are changed.167 For a relatively small sum, American investors will get not only the benefit of a close relationship with a Cuban farm that will become a new source of both import and export business in the future, but potentially gain access to innovative agricultural techniques that could be used in the United States immediately.168 Because the logistical structure needed to transport goods from large ru-ral farms into city markets remains underdeveloped, urban and suburban agricul-ture makes up a growing portion of the food produced and consumed in Cuba.169 As in other countries, the population trends in Cuba have continued to shift away from rural areas to more concentrated urban and suburban areas, with about three-fourths of Cubans living in cities.170 With this shift in population has also come a shift in the country’s agricultural system. As of 2007, about 15% of all agriculture in Cuba could be classified as urban agriculture.171 Not only have agricultural practices changed, but eating habits have as well. Without the Soviet Union to provide a ready source of income and the machinery needed to engage in large-scale livestock production, vegetable consumption has increased dramat-ically.172 Nearly every urban area has direct access to a wide variety of locally grown, organic produce.173 Many of the urban farms in Cuba, including the Vivero Alamar, make use of organoponics, a system where crops are produced in raised beds of soil on land that would otherwise be incapable of supporting intensive agricultural pro-duction.174 Many of these raised beds can be constructed in a concentrated area to support a wide variety of produce, with the typical organoponic garden covering anywhere from one half to several hectares in size.175 The rise of the organoponic production method was a shift away from the earlier centralized production mod-el employed by the state. It has been supported through intensive research and development by a variety of state agencies, such as the National Institute of Agri-cultural Science, and continued development has been guided through intensive training and educational programs.176 The organoponic system is not limited in its application to Cuban urban farms, but **maintains potential to be applied worldwide**, including in the United States. Urban agriculture in Cuba revitalized and put to use previously aban-doned and unused land. A similar approach could be applied to the United States as a means to restore blighted areas.177 Applying Cuban-derived organoponics in U.S. cities could potentially open up an enormous amount of land that was previ-ously unusable. From a business perspective, investing in an organoponic agri-cultural program in the United States is also a sound decision since the demand for local produce reached $4.8 billion in 2008 and is only expected to grow fur-ther, potentially reaching $7 billion in 2012. In an American city beset with high unemployment such as Detroit, Michigan, for example, investing in urban agriculture could potentially generate as many as five thousand new jobs.179 By utilizing Cuba’s system of organopon-ics, the need to use expensive and complex farm machinery could be significantly reduced. Already companies in the United States, such as Farmscape Gardens in southern California, recognize what Cuba’s organoponic system could achieve and have integrated it into their business practices.180 Rachel Bailin, a partner in the company, indicated that it was Cuba’s organic farming practices that helped inspire them to start a company devoted to urban agriculture.181 They have al-ready used Cuba’s organoponic farming methods to produce more than 50,000 pounds of produce since the spring of 2009.182 **The potential for future growth in this industry is huge**, as Farmscape Gardens’ current levels of production make it the largest urban agriculture company in the state of California.183Cuba not only offers attractive prospects for trading in the future, but methods of agriculture pioneered out of necessity have broad prospects if applied to agriculture in the United States. As the demand for locally grown produce continues to increase, a cost-effective and proven agricultural model like Cuba’s organoponic system may be just what is needed to allow for urban agriculture to flourish. VII. CONCLUSIONS The United States and Cuba have a long, complicated history that years of animosity and finger pointing have certainly done little to improve. For more than fifty years now, the United States has shunned one of its closest neighbors, but recent actions by the Obama administration indicate change is certainly a possibility. In conclusion, the future of trade relations with Cuba can be summed up as follows: First, truly open trade with Cuba is not likely to occur for many years. The political and foreign policy practices that have supported the embargo will not disappear overnight. What is more likely, though, is a continued and gradual relaxation of certain trade policies that will ultimately benefit a number of U.S. industries, agriculture included. While trade in agricultural products is currently possible on a limited scale, agricultural entities in the United States interested in trading with Cuba on a larger scale should begin their preparations now by forg-ing relationships with their Cuban counterparts. Opening the door to further trade will not happen without a concentrated and prolonged push by various in-terest groups in the United States. Second, certain companies that wish to do business in Cuba today are able to do so and should begin familiarizing themselves with the Cuban govern-mental entities such as Alimport. Barring a complete reorganization of the Cu-ban government, agencies such as Alimport will likely continue to oversee for-eign trade for the foreseeable future. Forming business relationships with Cuban companies in the short-term under existing regulations will help support broader trade opportunities in the future. Finally, what Cuba has accomplished in the field of cooperative and ur-ban agricultural products is remarkable, and should serve as an inspiration to farmers and businesses in the United States as well. The Cuban organoponic system of production has great potential for a variety of urban and suburban farming activities in the United States, particularly as demand for local and or-ganic produce continues to rise. As relations between Cuba and the United States continue to thaw in the coming years, organizations that began their preparations today will be best equipped to meet the challenges and opportunities posed by this new and grow-ing market. Political animosities will eventually crumble in the face of the eco-nomic opportunities that closer trade relations could bring to both nations. One of the United States’ closest neighbors has been its enemy for far too long. Cuba presents a unique opportunity American business and agricultural enterprises cannot afford to overlook.

**Access to the US market is critical to *sustainability* and *emulation***

Kost 04 – William is part of the Economic Research Service for the USDA. (“CUBAN AGRICULTURE: TO BE OR NOT TO BE ORGANIC?” 2004, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf)

MARKETS MAY BE CRITICAL FOR AN ORGANIC CUBA In addition to the above European markets, the successful expansion and viability of Cuba’s organic production may also depend on access to geographically close, high-income foreign markets, namely the United States and Canada. Currently, Cuban produce is not certified-organic in either of these markets. Only after Cuban products are certified for these countries could Cuba legally export produce labeled organic to these markets. Given that many technical production practices currently followed by Cuban producers are potentially compatible with U.S. certification standards and given Cuba’s prior experience in becoming Swiss-certified, Cuba could be well positioned to meet U.S. certification standards. For the U.S. organic market, in addition to a lifting of the U.S. embargo, Cuba would have to be certified by a USDA-accredited certification program that assures U.S. markets that Cuban products labeled organic meet all National Organic Program standards and regulations under the U.S. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990. If the U.S. embargo on Cuba were lifted, Cuban exports, once certified, could play a significant role in the U.S. organic market. In this current U.S. niche market, production costs are high. Opening the U.S. market would enable Cuba to exploit its significant **comparative advantage** in this area. This market could become a quick foreign exchange earner for Cuba. The largest barrier Cuba faces in expanding into the U.S. organic market will be meeting U.S. requirements for organic certification. Tapping the U.S. market may create sufficient price incentives for Cuban producers to take the necessary steps to meet the organic standards of other importing countries. Cuba could then expand production of organic produce geared to these specialty export markets. With sufficiently high prices for organic produce, urban labor may remain active in an organic urban gardening sector. Most likely, the viability of a vibrant organic produce production and processing sector in Cuba will depend on Cuba’s gaining access to the large, nearby U.S. market. Without such access, organic-oriented production of horticultural products in Cuba will likely remain a necessity-driven way to produce food for domestic consumption in an environment where other production approaches are just not available. The U.S. market is large and diverse. The demand for organic produce is only one portion of that market. How Cuba’s horticultural industry responds to restored U.S. trade will be a function of the relative price and cost incentives of the organic and non-organic market segments. If the organic price premiums are sufficient, Cuba has the climate, land resources, low-cost labor, and history of organicoriented production to allow it to develop and grow its horticultural sector in that direction. If the market incentives are not sufficiently large to pursue the organic produce market, Cuba will return to a chemical- and technology-driven, yield-maximizing, and labor-minimizing commercial production as rapidly as they can afford to do so. Cuba will have some incentive to increase domestic food production as rapidly as possible to feed the domestic population, rather than importing food for domestic consumption. Cuba could then use a larger share of its scarce foreign exchange to import energy, technology, and other inputs to support growth in other sectors of the Cuban economy.

**Status quo food production is failing—a shift to urban agriculture is key to *sustainable food systems* and *biodiversity preservation***

Peters 10 – LL.M. expected 2011, University of Arkansas School of Law, Graduate Program in Agricultural and Food Law; J.D. 2010, University of Oregon School of Law. (“Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution”, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, Vol. 25, 203, http://law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

URBAN AGRICULTURE Urban agriculture is a system that ensures food security by providing access to land and resources to support urban farming efforts.68 The United Nations Development Programme defines urban agriculture as follows: [A]n industry that produces, processes, and markets food and fuel, largely in response to the daily demand of consumers within a town, city, or metropolis, on land and water dispersed throughout the urban and peri-urban area, applying intensive production methods, using and reusing natural resources and urban wastes, to yield a diversity of crops and livestock.69 In the United States, urban agriculture is perhaps better known as community gardening.70 Community gardens are areas where residents grow food on publicly held or privately held land that they do not own.71 Most often, community gardens are located within neighborhoods, on public housing premises, or on school grounds.72 In the face of an imminent food shortage, especially in light of the economic and energy crises discussed above, it is **imperative that urban residents expand** urban **food production**. Neglected and abandoned vacant lots in blighted urban areas comprise a vast amount of land that could be converted into urban gardens.73 In addition to vacant lots, other urban areas including schoolyards, hospital grounds, parks and other open spaces, utility easements, alleys, rooftops, building walls,75 and even windowsills all provide opportunities for urban agriculture.76 While the many benefits of a sustainable urban agricultural system will be discussed below, additional benefits to urban communities deserve mention here. Urban gardens beautify and green urban neighborhoods while also building a sense of community.77 Urban gardens provide educational and employment opportunities, promote self-respect, and can even reduce crime rates.78 These gardens also offer urban residents an opportunity to connect with nature and can instill environmental ethics.79 Additionally, urban gardens promote entrepreneurship, as urban farmers can sell excess produce at farmers’ markets, through Community Supported Agriculture programs,80 and directly to restaurants.81 Finally, urban gardening provides lowincome urban residents with a supply of fresh and healthy organic food that can combat problems associated with inadequate nutrition, such as illness, fatigue, depression, anxiety, and hunger.82 IV SUSTAINABILITY Sustainability is best described as a concept of making decisions for the courses of action we choose in a way that balances the three “E’s” of sustainability—environment, economy, and social equity83 — as well as the lesser known prong of sustainability, national security.84 Sustainability is a big-picture concept. Our individual actions as well as local, state, and federal policies do not exist in a vacuum; every action has an impact on the world at large and on future generations. To create a truly sustainable world, all of our decisions, from individual choices to federal policies, must consider the impact on the environment, economy, society, and national security. Media coverage, marketing of consumer products,85 and recent documentaries have all contributed to bringing the terms “green” and “sustainability” into our everyday vocabulary,86 yet no clear definitions of these terms exist. While green focuses on protection of the environment, sustainability is much broader. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development, in the Brundtland Report, defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”87 At a more fundamental level, sustainability can be defined as “able to be sustained,”88 where sustain means to “strengthen or support physically or mentally . . . [to] keep (something) going over time or continuously.”89 In this broader context, sustainability requires that we look at our current lifestyles and practices and evaluate their capability of being continued indefinitely. Much of the recent attention concerning sustainability focuses on technologies designed to reduce energy consumption and foster development of renewable energy sources.90 Little discourse has been directed towards the immediate impact individuals can have merely by reducing personal levels of consumption through a simplified lifestyle, yet such a reduction would yield immediate results and require little financial investment. As individuals, we can foster sustainability while increasing our food supply simply by providing more for ourselves through a sustainable urban agricultural system. Government incentives, discussed infra Part VII, provide land and resources that would enable individuals and communities to take action to transform our agricultural system into one that is both sustainable and secure. In the following sections, this Note provides an overview of each of the four elements of sustainability—environment, economy, equity, and national security. This Note also discusses modern industrial agriculture, urban development trends, and urban agriculture in terms of the elements of sustainability. A. Environmental Sustainability In the environmental context, sustainability encourages production and development methods that preserve and protect our natural resources and reduce our impact on the environment.91 This involves “protecting existing environmental resources (both in the natural and ‘built’ world), including the preservation of historical sites and the development of environmental resources and assets for future use.”92 To accomplish this goal, we must find innovative ways to reduce our consumption of resources and replenish the resources we do consume. We must protect biodiversity and ecosystems, as well as our land, air, and water resources by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, carbon footprints, air and water pollution, and soil contamination.93 In the context of land use and food production, environmental sustainability demands that we conserve undeveloped land and employ food production methods that will have a minimal impact on the planet. 1. Environmental Sustainability and Industrial Agriculture Industrial agriculture is a system in which economies of scale and maximization of profits are the ultimate goals.94 Profits are maximized when agribusinesses produce the largest yield of single crops at the lowest possible cost, primarily through mechanization and intensive use of agricultural chemicals.95 As discussed supra Part I, the environmental effects of industrial agricultural methods include soil erosion, depletion of soil nutrients, groundwater contamination from chemical inputs, and consumption of finite fuels.96 Additionally, as crop yields decline due to environmental degradation and demand for agricultural products rises due to population growth and the increased use of plant-derived biofuels, more and more land will be consumed by industrial agriculture. This will result in an agricultural system that depletes and destroys natural resources at an increasing rate, which will negatively impact the planet’s carrying capacity.97 Along with farm subsidies and corporate control of food production in the United States, policies that allow the harms of industrial agriculture to be treated as externalities help perpetuate the current agricultural system.98 Under the current system, agribusinesses may pollute the environment, deplete clean water and soil, and promote social inequity without having to account for these harms when calculating profits. These external costs are significant; contaminated industrial farm runoff alone causes an estimated $9 billion of damage annually to U.S. surface waters.99 Further, the externalization of these costs discourages agribusinesses from conserving water, fertile land, and other natural resources. 2. Environmental Sustainability and Urban Development Trends Current urban development trends impact the environment in several significant ways. The most direct impacts are land consumption and the destruction of natural habitats.100 While interior urban areas are deteriorating and being abandoned at an increasing rate, the constant consumption of land to support new urban development is destroying greenfields, forests, and species.101 These new communities require land not only for building homes and businesses, but also for housing public services, such as schools and hospitals, and for creating an expanded transportation infrastructure.102 Increased commuting associated with urban sprawl and flight from blighted areas relies on oil, a finite resource with decreasing availability, and significantly contributes to greenhouse gas emissions,103 which pollute the air and contribute to climate change.104 Urban sprawl further contributes to the degradation of the environment by polluting water sources with runoff from newly constructed impervious surfaces such as homes and transportation infrastructures.105 During the construction phase, stormwater flows over construction sites, “pick[ing] up debris, chemicals, and sediment that flow into water bodies.”106 Water pollution continues to degrade the environment post-construction as stormwater runoff from paved surfaces, including new roads and highways, is also contaminated.107 3. Environmental Sustainability and Urban Agriculture Transitioning from an industrial agricultural system to a sustainable urban agricultural system would minimize the impacts of food production on the planet. Urban agriculture reduces the consumption of undeveloped land for farming. Food would be produced in areas that are already developed and populated, thereby conserving open space for natural habitat. Due to the proximity of urban gardens to dwellings and other buildings, urban agriculture must be performed without the use of large machinery and without the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers.108 While lack of such inputs could be perceived as a challenge, urban gardening methods may result in increased crop yields on smaller plots of land than conventional farming practices achieve.109 Rather than maximizing crop yields through extensive use of chemicals, sustainable agriculture relies on crop rotation, composting, biofertilizers, and other organic farming techniques to improve soil fertility.110 Organic farming methods also protect water resources because organic farms do not use chemical inputs so there is no contamination of groundwater and streams.111 Furthermore, organic fertilizers reduce the amount of waste deposited in landfills because they are made from composted and recycled food waste, leaves, and lawn clippings.112 Urban gardening reduces the effects of climate change by decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike industrial farms, urban gardens are cultivated and harvested with minimal mechanization and do not use oil-based fertilizers.113 Moreover, food that is grown and sold locally eliminates the need for wasteful plastic packaging and fossil-fueled transport to market.114 Additionally, having fresh food available in every neighborhood would reduce carbon-emitting automobile trips to the grocery store.115 Urban agriculture presents an opportunity to reverse the decline of urban areas. A significant benefit of urban gardens is the beautification of urban neighborhoods and strengthening of community spirit.116 Urban gardens also can prompt the cleanup of contaminated vacant lots.117 Furthermore, increasing the amount of vegetation in urban areas would reduce surface temperatures during hot months and improve urban air quality.118 B. Economic Sustainability Sustainability requires that economic growth and development must be integrated with environmental protection and sustainable utilization of resources.119 Economic growth and development must also promote both intergenerational and intragenerational equity.120 While a steadily expanding economy is considered prosperity, a growing world population coupled with increasing overall consumption threatens to strain our planet beyond its carrying capacity.121 When economic stability is equated with increased consumption, we push the limits of the planet’s carrying capacity. Simply put, we are depleting the Earth’s resources at a rate that threatens the Earth’s future ability to support our species. The economic aspect of sustainability also addresses the fact that many of the planet’s resources are treated as externalities in the marketplace.122 For example, the costs of depleting natural resources and polluting the air, water, and ground are not reflected in the price of goods. Through regulations, mandates, and incentives, the U.S. government addresses some of these environmental costs,123 but more must be done to implement policies that will incorporate external costs into pricing structures. 1. Economic Sustainability and Industrial Agriculture **Industrial agriculture is not economically sustainable**. Industrial agriculture seeks to maximize profits without regard for environmental degradation or the long-term effects of heavy reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilizers. Rather than balancing economic growth with environmental protection and equity, industrial agriculture concentrates on maximizing profits at the expense of the environment and society, both in the present and the future. The United States currently has no regulations or policies in place that would impose costs upon agribusinesses for externalities;124 rather, current policies promote harmful industrial agricultural methods.125 A food production system that allows businesses to maximize profits without concern for its impact on society and the environment is not sustainable.

**Ecosystem collapse causes extinction**

**WATSON 2006** (Captain Paul, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, has a show on Animal Planet, Last Mod 9-17, http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)

The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth. Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught. The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a **biological**, if not a literal **desert** for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, gint auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.

**A move towards organic ag *mitigates future emissions* and *prevents warming***

Scialabba 10 – Nadia is from the Natural Resources Management and Environment Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (“Organic agriculture and climate change”, February 2, 2010, Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 25.2, <http://www.fao.org/docs/eims/upload/275960/al185e.pdf>)

Organic agricultural systems have an inherent potential to both reduce GHG emissions and to enhance carbon sequestration in the soil (Table 1). An important potential contribution of organically managed systems is the careful management of nutrients, and hence the reduction of N2 O emissions from soils, which are the most relevant single source of direct GHG emissions from agriculture. More research is needed to quantify and improve the effects of organic paddy rice production and to develop strategies to reduce methane emissions from enteric fermentation (e.g., by promoting double-use breeds). Indirect GHG emissions are reduced in organic systems by avoidance of mineral fertilizers. With the current organic consumers’ demand, further emission reductions are expected when organic standards include speciﬁc climate standards that consider, inter alia, reduced energy consumption in the organic food chain (e.g., limitations on greenhouse heating/cooling, processing and packaging, food miles combined with life cycle assessment). The advantage of organic systems is that they are driven by aware consumers and that they already carry a guarantee system of veriﬁcation and labeling which is consonant with climate labeling113 . The highest mitigation potential of organic agriculture lies in carbon sequestration in soils and in reduced clearing of primary ecosystems. The total amount of mitigation is difﬁcult to quantify, because it is highly dependent on local environmental conditions and management practices. Should all agricultural systems be managed organically, the omission of mineral fertilizer production and application is estimated to reduce the agricultural GHG emissions by about 20% — 10% caused by reduced N2 O emissions and about 10% by lower energy demand. These avoided emissions are supplemented by an emission compensation potential through carbon sequestration in croplands and grasslands of about 40–72% of the current annual agricultural GHG emissions76. However, further research is needed to conﬁrm these ﬁgures, as long-term scientiﬁc studies are limited and do not apply to different kinds of soils, climates and practices. To date, most of the research on the mitigation potential of agricultural practices has been carried out in developed countries; dedicated investigations are needed to assess and understand the mitigation potential in tropical and subtropical areas and under the predominant management practices of developing countries. More importantly, the adaptation aspects of organic agricultural practices must be the focus of public policies and research. One of the main effects of climate change is an increase of uncertainties, both for weather events and global food markets. Organic agriculture has a strong potential for building resilience in the face of climate variability (Table 2). The total abstention from synthetic inputs in organic agriculture has been a strong incentive to develop agricultural management practices that optimize the natural production potential of speciﬁc agro-ecosystems, based on traditional knowledge and modern research. These strategies can be used to enhance agricultural communities that have no access to purchased inputs, which is the case of the majority of the rural poor. The main organic strategies are diversiﬁcation and an increase of soil organic matter, which both could enhance resilience against extreme weather events and are recommended by the IPCC. These strategies have, in particular, a high potential to enhance the productivity of degraded soils, especially in marginal areas, while enhancing soil carbon sequestration. The adaptive approach inherent to organic agriculture offers simultaneous climate mitigation beneﬁts. Finally, certiﬁed organic products cater for higher income options for producers and hence a market-based incentive for environmental stewardship. The scaling-up of organic agriculture would promote and support climatefriendly farming practices worldwide. However, investments in research and development of organic agriculture are needed to better unlock its potential and application on a large scale.

**Warming causes extinction and the threshold is soon**

**Roberts 13** – citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies - 4 degree projected warming, can’t adapt - heat wave related deaths, forest fires, crop production, water wars, ocean acidity, sea level rise, climate migrants, biodiversity loss. ("If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention", January 10, 2013, [http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal](http://grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/~~))

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially **exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems**. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a **burned, chaotic, denuded world**, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

**Warming is *real* and *anthropogenic*—reject skeptics**

Prothero 12 – Donald R. Prothero is a Professor of Geology at Occidental College and Lecturer in Geobiology at the California Institute of Technology. (“How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused”, 3/1/2012, http://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/12-02-08/)

How do we know that global warming is real and primarily human caused? There are numerous lines of evidence that converge to this conclusion. Carbon Dioxide Increase. Carbon dioxide in our atmosphere has increased at an unprecedented rate in the past 200 years. Not one data set collected over a long enough span of time shows otherwise. Mann et al. (1999) compiled the past 900 years’ worth of temperature data from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and direct measurements of the past few centuries, and the sudden increase of temperature of the past century stands out like a sore thumb. This famous graph (see Figure 1 above) is now known as the “hockey stick” because it is long and straight through most of its length, then bends sharply upward at the end like the blade of a hockey stick. Other graphs show that climate was very stable within a narrow range of variation through the past 1000, 2000, or even 10,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age. There were minor warming events during the Climatic Optimum about 7000 years ago, the Medieval Warm Period, and the slight cooling of the Little Ice Age from the 1700s and 1800s. But the magnitude and rapidity of the warming represented by the last 200 years is simply unmatched in all of human history. More revealing, the timing of this warming coincides with the Industrial Revolution, when humans first began massive deforestation and released carbon dioxide by burning coal, gas, and oil.

Melting Polar Ice Caps. The polar icecaps are thinning and breaking up at an alarming rate. In 2000, my former graduate advisor Malcolm McKenna was one of the first humans to fly over the North Pole in summer time and see no ice, just open water. The Arctic ice cap has been frozen solid for at least the past 3 million years and maybe longer3, but now the entire ice sheet is breaking up so fast that by 2030 (and possibly sooner) less than half of the Arctic will be ice covered in the summer.4 As one can see from watching the news, this is an ecological disaster for everything that lives up there, from the polar bears to the seals and walruses to the animals they feed upon, to the 4 million people whose world is melting beneath their feet. The Antarctic is thawing even faster. In February–March 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf—over 3000 square km (the size of Rhode Island) and 220 m (700 feet) thick—broke up in just a few months, a story typical of nearly all the ice shelves in Antarctica. The Larsen B shelf had survived all the previous ice ages and interglacial warming episodes for the past 3 million years, and even the warmest periods of the last 10,000 years—yet it and nearly all the other thick ice sheets on the Arctic, Greenland, and Antarctic are vanishing at a rate never before seen in geologic history.

Melting Glaciers. Glaciers are all retreating at the highest rates ever documented. Many of those glaciers, especially in the Himalayas, Andes, Alps, and Sierras, provide most of the freshwater that the populations below the mountains depend upon—yet this fresh water supply is vanishing. Just think about the percentage of world’s population in southern Asia (especially India) that depend on Himalayan snowmelt for their fresh water. The implications are staggering. The permafrost that once remained solidly frozen even in the summer has now thawed, damaging the Inuit villages on the Arctic coast and threatening all our pipelines to the North Slope of Alaska. This is catastrophic not only for life on the permafrost, but as it thaws, the permafrost releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases and is one of the major contributors to global warming. Not only is the ice vanishing, but we have seen record heat waves over and over again, killing thousands of people, as each year joins the list of the hottest years on record. (2010 just topped that list as the hottest year, surpassing the previous record in 2009, and we shall know about 2011 soon enough). Natural animal and plant populations are being devastated all over the globe as their environment changes.5 Many animals respond by moving their ranges to formerly cold climates, so now places that once did not have to worry about disease-bearing mosquitoes are infested as the climate warms and allows them to breed further north.

Sea Level Rise. All that melted ice eventually ends up in the ocean, causing sea level to rise, as it has many times in the geologic past. At present, sea level is rising about 3–4 mm per year, more than ten times the rate of 0.1–0.2 mm/year that has occurred over the past 3000 years. Geological data show that sea level was virtually unchanged over the past 10,000 years since the present interglacial began. A few millimeters here or there doesn’t impress people, until you consider that the rate is accelerating and that most scientists predict sea level will rise 80–130 cm in just the next century. A sea level rise of 1.3 m (almost 4 feet) would drown many of the world’s low-elevation cities, such as Venice and New Orleans, and low-lying countries such as the Netherlands or Bangladesh. A number of tiny island nations such as Vanuatu and the Maldives, which barely poke out above the ocean now, are already vanishing beneath the waves. Eventually their entire population will have to move someplace else.6 Even a small sea level rise might not drown all these areas, but they are much more vulnerable to the large waves of a storm surge (as happened with Hurricane Katrina), which could do much more damage than sea level rise alone. If sea level rose by 6 m (20 feet), most of the world’s coastal plains and low-lying areas (such as the Louisiana bayous, Florida, and most of the world’s river deltas) would be drowned.

Most of the world’s population lives in coastal cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Miami, Shanghai, and London. All of those cities would be partially or completely under water with such a sea level rise. If all the glacial ice caps melted completely (as they have several times before during past greenhouse episodes in the geologic past), sea level would rise by 65 m (215 feet)! The entire Mississippi Valley would flood, so you could dock your boat in Cairo, Illinois. Such a sea level rise would drown nearly every coastal region under hundreds of feet of water, and inundate New York City, London and Paris. All that would remain would be the tall landmarks, such as the Empire State Building, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower. You could tie your boats to these pinnacles, but the rest of these drowned cities would be deep under water.

Climate Deniers’ Arguments and Scientists’ Rebuttals

Despite the overwhelming evidence there are many people who remain skeptical. One reason is that they have been fed lies, distortions, and misstatements by the global warming denialists who want to cloud or confuse the issue. Let’s examine some of these claims in detail:

“It’s just natural climatic variability.” No, it is not. As I detailed in my 2009 book, Greenhouse of the Dinosaurs, geologists and paleoclimatologists know a lot about past greenhouse worlds, and the icehouse planet that has existed for the past 33 million years. We have a good understanding of how and why the Antarctic ice sheet first appeared at that time, and how the Arctic froze over about 3.5 million years ago, beginning the 24 glacial and interglacial episodes of the “Ice Ages” that have occurred since then. We know how variations in the earth’s orbit (the Milankovitch cycles) controls the amount of solar radiation the earth receives, triggering the shifts between glacial and interglacial periods. Our current warm interglacial has already lasted 10,000 years, the duration of most previous interglacials, so if it were not for global warming, we would be headed into the next glacial in the next 1000 years or so. Instead, our pumping greenhouse gases into our atmosphere after they were long trapped in the earth’s crust has pushed the planet into a “super-interglacial,” already warmer than any previous warming period. We can see the “big picture” of climate variability most clearly in the EPICA cores from Antarctica (see Figure 2 below), which show the details of the last 650,000 years of glacial-interglacial cycles. At no time during any previous interglacial did the carbon dioxide levels exceed 300 ppm, even at their very warmest. Our atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are already close to 400 ppm today. The atmosphere is headed to 600 ppm within a few decades, even if we stopped releasing greenhouse gases immediately. This is decidedly not within the normal range of “climatic variability,” but clearly unprecedented in human history. Anyone who says this is “normal variability” has never seen the huge amount of paleoclimatic data that show otherwise. “It’s just another warming episode, like the Mediaeval Warm Period, or the Holocene Climatic Optimum” or the end of the Little Ice Age.” Untrue. There were numerous small fluctuations of warming and cooling over the last 10,000 years of the Holocene. But in the case of the Mediaeval Warm Period (about 950–1250 A.D.), the temperatures increased by only 1°C, much less than we have seen in the current episode of global warming (see Figure 1). This episode was also only a local warming in the North Atlantic and northern Europe. Global temperatures over this interval did not warm at all, and actually cooled by more than 1°C. Likewise, the warmest period of the last 10,000 years was the Holocene Climatic Optimum (5000–9000 B.C.) when warmer and wetter conditions in Eurasia caused the rise of the first great civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and China. This was largely a Northern Hemisphere-Eurasian phenomenon, with 2–3°C warming in the Arctic and northern Europe. But there was almost no warming in the tropics, and cooling or no change in the Southern Hemisphere.7 To the Eurocentric world, these warming events seemed important, but on a global scale the effect is negligible. In addition, neither of these warming episodes is related to increasing greenhouse gases. The Holocene Climatic Optimum, in fact, is predicted by the Milankovitch cycles, since at that time the axial tilt of the earth was 24°, its steepest value, meaning the Northern Hemisphere got more solar radiation than normal—but the Southern Hemisphere less, so the two balanced. By contrast, not only is the warming observed in the last 200 years much greater than during these previous episodes, but it is also global and bipolar, so it is not a purely local effect. The warming that ended the Little Ice Age (from the mid-1700s to the late 1800s) was due to increased solar radiation prior to 1940. Since 1940, however, the amount of solar radiation has been dropping, so the only candidate for the post-1940 warming has to be carbon dioxide.8

“It’s just the sun, or cosmic rays, or volcanic activity or methane.” **Nope**, sorry. The amount of heat that the sun provides has been decreasing since 19409, just the opposite of the denialists’ claims. There is no evidence (see Figure 3 below) of increase in cosmic radiation during the past century.10 Nor is there any clear evidence that large-scale volcanic events (such as the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia, which changed global climate for about a year) have any long-term effect that would explain 200 years of warming and carbon dioxide increase. Volcanoes erupt only 0.3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year, but humans emit over 29 billion tonnes a year11, roughly 100 times as much. Clearly, we have a bigger effect. Methane is a more powerful greenhouse gas, but there is 200 times more carbon dioxide than methane, so carbon dioxide is still the most important agent.12 Every other alternative has been looked at, but the only clear-cut relationship is between human-caused carbon dioxide increase and global warming. “The climate records since 1995 (or 1998) show cooling.” That’s a deliberate deception. People who throw this argument out are cherry-picking the data.13 Over the short term, there was a slight cooling trend from 1998–2000 (see Figure 4 below), because 1998 was a record-breaking El Niño year, so the next few years look cooler by comparison. But since 2002, the overall long-term trend of warming is unequivocal. This statement is a clear-cut case of using out-of-context data in an attempt to deny reality. All of the 16 hottest years ever recorded on a global scale have occurred in the last 20 years. They are (in order of hottest first): 2010, 2009, 1998, 2005, 2003, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2001, 1997, 2008, 1995, 1999, 1990, and 2000.14 In other words, every year since 2000 has been in the Top Ten hottest years list, and the rest of the list includes 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Only 1996 failed to make the list (because of the short-term cooling mentioned already).

“We had record snows in the winters of 2009–2010, and in 2010–2011.” So what? This is nothing more than the difference between weather (short-term seasonal changes) and climate (the long-term average of weather over decades and centuries and longer). Our local weather tells us nothing about another continent, or the global average; it is only a local effect, determined by short-term atmospheric and oceanographic conditions.15 In fact, warmer global temperatures mean more moisture in the atmosphere, which increases the intensity of normal winter snowstorms. In this particular case, the climate denialists forget that the early winter of November–December 2009 was actually very mild and warm, and then only later in January and February did it get cold and snow heavily. That warm spell in early winter helped bring more moisture into the system, so that when cold weather occurred, the snows were worse. In addition, the snows were unusually heavy only in North America; the rest of the world had different weather, and the global climate was warmer than average. And the summer of 2010 was the hottest on record, breaking the previous record set in 2009.

“Carbon dioxide is good for plants, so the world will be better off.” Who do they think they’re kidding? The people who promote this idea clearly don’t know much global geochemistry, or are trying to cynically take advantage of the fact that most people are ignorant of science. The Competitive Enterprise Institute (funded by oil and coal companies and conservative foundations16) has run a series of shockingly stupid ads concluding with the tag line “Carbon dioxide: they call it pollution, we call it life.” Anyone who knows the basic science of earth’s atmosphere can spot the deceptions in this ad.17 Sure, plants take in carbon dioxide that animals exhale, as they have for millions of years. But the whole point of the global warming evidence (as shown from ice cores) is that the delicate natural balance of carbon dioxide has been thrown out of whack by our production of too much of it, way in excess of what plants or the oceans can handle. As a consequence, the oceans are warming18 and absorbing excess carbon dioxide making them more acidic. Already we are seeing a shocking decline in coral reefs (“bleaching”) and extinctions in many marine ecosystems that can’t handle too much of a good thing. Meanwhile, humans are busy cutting down huge areas of temperate and tropical forests, which not only means there are fewer plants to absorb the gas, but the slash and burn practices are releasing more carbon dioxide than plants can keep up with. There is much debate as to whether increased carbon dioxide might help agriculture in some parts of the world, but that has to be measured against the fact that other traditional “breadbasket” regions (such as the American Great Plains) are expected to get too hot to be as productive as they are today. The latest research19 actually shows that increased carbon dioxide inhibits the absorption of nitrogen into plants, so plants (at least those that we depend upon today) are not going to flourish in a greenhouse world. Anyone who tells you otherwise is ignorant of basic atmospheric science.

“I agree that climate is changing, but I’m skeptical that humans are the main cause, so we shouldn’t do anything.” This is just fence sitting. A lot of reasonable skeptics deplore the “climate denialism” of the right wing, but still want to be skeptical about the cause. If they want proof, they can examine the huge array of data that directly points to humans causing global warming.20 We can directly measure the amount of carbon dioxide humans are producing, and it tracks exactly with the amount of increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide. Through carbon isotope analysis, we can show that this carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is coming directly from our burning of fossil fuels, not from natural sources. We can also measure oxygen levels that drop as we produce more carbon that then combines with oxygen to produce carbon dioxide. We have satellites in space that are measuring the heat released from the planet and can actually see the atmosphere get warmer. The most crucial proof emerged only in the past few years: climate models of the greenhouse effect predict that there should be cooling in the stratosphere (the upper layer of the atmosphere above 10 km (6 miles) in elevation, but warming in the troposphere (the bottom layer of the atmosphere below 10 km (6 miles), and that’s exactly what our space probes have measured. Finally, we can rule out any other culprits (see above): solar heat is decreasing since 1940, not increasing, and there are no measurable increases in cosmic radiation, methane, volcanic gases, or any other potential cause. Face it—it’s our problem.

Why Do People Deny Climate Change? Thanks to all the noise and confusion over the debate, the general public has only a vague idea of what the debate is really about, and only about half of Americans think global warming is real or that we are to blame.21 As in the debate over evolution and creationism, the scientific community is virtually unanimous on what the data demonstrate about anthropogenic global warming. This has been true for over a decade. When science historian Naomi Oreskes surveyed all peer-reviewed papers on climate change published between 1993 and 2003 in the world’s leading scientific journal, Science, she found that there were 980 supporting the idea of human-induced global warming and none opposing it. In 2009, Doran and Kendall Zimmerman23 surveyed all the climate scientists who were familiar with the data. They found that 95–99% agreed that global warming is real and that humans are the reason. In 2010, the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study that showed that 98% of the scientists who actually do research in climate change are in agreement with anthropogenic global warming.24 Every major scientific organization in the world has endorsed the conclusion of anthropogenic climate change as well. This is a rare degree of agreement within such an independent and cantankerous group as the world’s top scientists. This is the same degree of scientific consensus that scientists have achieved over most major ideas, including **gravity, evolution, and relativity.** These and only a few other topics in science can claim this degree of agreement among nearly all the world’s leading scientists, especially among everyone who is close to the scientific data and knows the problem intimately. If it were not such a controversial topic politically, there would be almost no interest in debating it, since the evidence is so clear-cut. If the climate science community speaks with one voice (as in the 2007 IPCC report, and every report since then), why is there still any debate at all? The answer has been revealed by a number of investigations by diligent reporters who got past the PR machinery denying global warming, and uncovered the money trail. Originally, there was no real “dissenters” to the idea of global warming by scientists who are actually involved with climate research. Instead, the forces with vested interests in denying global climate change (the energy companies, and the “free-market” advocates) followed the strategy of tobacco companies: create a smokescreen of confusion and prevent the American public from recognizing scientific consensus. As the famous memo25 from the tobacco lobbyists said “Doubt is our product.” The denialists generated an anti-science movement entirely out of thin air and PR. The evidence for this PR conspiracy has been well documented in numerous sources. For example, Oreskes and Conway revealed from memos leaked to the press that in April 1998 the right-wing Marshall Institute, SEPP (Fred Seitz’s lobby that aids tobacco companies and polluters), and ExxonMobil, met in secret at the American Petroleum Institute’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. There they planned a $20 million campaign to get “respected scientists” to cast doubt on climate change, get major PR efforts going, and lobby Congress that global warming isn’t real and is not a threat.

The right-wing institutes and the energy lobby beat the bushes to find scientists—any scientists—who might disagree with the scientific consensus. As investigative journalists and scientists have documented over and over again,26 the denialist conspiracy essentially paid for the testimony of anyone who could be useful to them. The day that the 2007 IPCC report was released (Feb. 2, 2007), the British newspaper The Guardian reported that the conservative American Enterprise Institute (funded largely by oil companies and conservative think tanks) had offered $10,000 plus travel expenses to scientists who would write negatively about the IPCC report.27

We are accustomed to the hired-gun “experts” paid by lawyers to muddy up the evidence in the case they are fighting, but this is extraordinary—buying scientists outright to act as shills for organizations trying to deny scientific reality. With this kind of money, however, you can always find a fringe scientist or crank or someone with no relevant credentials who will do what they’re paid to do. The NCSE satirized this tactic of composing phony “lists of scientists” with their “Project Steve.”28 They showed that there were more scientists named “Steve” than their entire list of “scientists who dispute evolution.” It may generate lots of PR and a smokescreen to confuse the public, but it doesn’t change the fact that scientists who actually do research in climate change are unanimous in their insistence that anthropogenic global warming is a real threat. Most scientists I know and respect work very hard for little pay, yet they still cannot be paid to endorse some scientific idea they know to be false.

The climate deniers have a lot of other things in common with creationists and other anti-science movements. They too like to quote someone out of context (“quote mining”), finding a short phrase in the work of legitimate scientists that seems to support their position. But when you read the full quote in context, it is obvious that they have used the quote inappropriately. The original author meant something that does not support their goals. The “Climategate scandal” is a classic case of this. It started with a few stolen emails from the Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. If you read the complete text of the actual emails29 and comprehend the scientific shorthand of climate scientists who are talking casually to each other, it is clear that there was no great “conspiracy” or that they were faking data. All six subsequent investigations have cleared Philip Jones and the other scientists of the University of East Anglia of any wrongdoing or conspiracy.30

Even if there had been some conspiracy on the part of these few scientists, there is no reason to believe that the entire climate science community is secretly working together to generate false information and mislead the public. If there’s one thing that is clear about science, it’s about competition and criticism, not conspiracy and collusion. Most labs are competing with each other, not conspiring together. If one lab publishes a result that is not clearly defensible, other labs will quickly correct it. As James Lawrence Powell wrote31:

Scientists….show no evidence of being more interested in politics or ideology than the average American. Does it make sense to believe that tens of thousands of scientists would be so deeply and secretly committed to bringing down capitalism and the American way of life that they would spend years beyond their undergraduate degrees working to receive master’s and Ph.D. degrees, then go to work in a government laboratory or university, plying the deep oceans, forbidding deserts, icy poles, and torrid jungles, all for far less money than they could have made in industry, all the while biding their time like a Russian sleeper agent in an old spy novel? Scientists tend to be independent and resist authority. That is why you are apt to find them in the laboratory or in the field, as far as possible from the prying eyes of a supervisor. Anyone who believes he could organize thousands of scientists into a conspiracy has never attended a single faculty meeting.

There are many more traits that the climate deniers share with the creationists and Holocaust deniers and others who distort the truth. They pick on small disagreements between different labs as if scientists can’t get their story straight, when in reality there is always a fair amount of give and take between competing labs as they try to get the answer right before the other lab can do so. The key point here is that when all these competing labs around the world have reached a consensus and get the same answer, there is no longer any reason to doubt their common conclusion. The anti-scientists of climate denialism will also point to small errors by individuals in an effort to argue that the entire enterprise cannot be trusted. It is true that scientists are human, and do make mistakes, but the great power of the scientific method is that peer review weeds these out, so that when scientists speak with consensus, there is no doubt that their data are checked carefully.

Finally, a powerful line of evidence that this is a purely political controversy, rather than a scientific debate, is that the membership lists of the creationists and the climate deniers are highly overlapping. Both anti-scientific dogmas are fed to their overlapping audiences through right-wing media such as Fox News, Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh. Just take a look at the “intelligent-design” creationism website for the Discovery Institute. Most of the daily news items lately have nothing to do with creationism at all, but are focused on climate denial and other right-wing causes.32

If the data about global climate change are indeed valid and robust, any qualified scientist should be able to look at them and see if the prevailing scientific interpretation holds up. Indeed, such a test took place. Starting in 2010, a group led by U.C. Berkeley physicist Richard Muller re-examined all the temperature data from the NOAA, East Anglia Hadley Climate Research Unit, and the Goddard Institute of Space Science sources (see Figure 5 below). Even though Muller started out as a skeptic of the temperature data, and was funded by the Koch brothers and other oil company sources, he carefully checked and re-checked the research himself. When the GOP leaders called him to testify before the House Science and Technology Committee in spring 2011, they were expecting him to discredit the temperature data. Instead, Muller shocked his GOP sponsors by demonstrating his scientific integrity and telling the truth: the temperature increase is real, and the scientists who have demonstrated that the climate is changing are right. In the fall of 2011, his study was published, and the conclusions were clear: global warming is real, even to a right-wing skeptical scientist. Unlike the hired-gun scientists who play political games, Muller did what a true scientist should do: if the data go against your biases and preconceptions, then do the right thing and admit it—even if you’ve been paid by sponsors who want to discredit global warming. Muller is a shining example of a scientist whose integrity and honesty came first, and did not sell out to the highest bidder. Science and Anti-Science

## 2AC

### Warming

#### Continued reliance on industrial mechanized ag results in *catastrophic warming* and *biodiversity loss*

Cummins 10 – Ronnie is the International Director of the Organic Consumers Association. (“Industrial Agriculture and Human Survival: The Road Beyond 10/10/10”, Organic Consumer’s Association, October 7, 2010, <http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_21747.cfm>)

Although transportation, industry, and energy producers are obviously major fossil fuel users and greenhouse gas polluters, not enough people understand that the worst U.S. and global greenhouse gas emitter is "Food Incorporated," transnational industrial food and farming, of which Monsanto and GMOs constitute a major part. Industrial farming, including 173 million acres of GE soybeans, corn, cotton, canola, and sugar beets, accounts for at least 35% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (EPA's ridiculously low estimates range from 7% to 12%, while some climate scientists feel the figure could be as high as 50% or more). Industrial agriculture, biofuels, and non-sustainable cattle grazing - including cutting down the last remaining tropical rainforests in Latin America and Asia for GMO and chemical-intensive animal feed and biofuels - are also the main driving forces in **global deforestation and wetlands destruction**, which generate an additional 20% of all climate destabilizing GHGs. In other words the direct (food, fiber, and biofuels production, food processing, food distribution) and indirect damage (deforestation and destruction of wetlands) of industrial agriculture, GMOs, and the food industry are the major cause of global warming. Unless we take down Monsanto and Food Inc. and make the Great Transition to a relocalized system of organic food and farming, we and our children are doomed to reside in Climate Hell. Overall 78% of climate destabilizing greenhouse gases come from CO2, while the remainder come from methane, nitrous oxide, and black carbon or soot. To stabilize the climate we will need to drastically reduce all of these greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO2, and sequester twice as much carbon matter in the soil (through organic farming and ranching, and forest and wetlands restoration) as we are doing presently. Currently GMO and industrial/factory farms (energy and chemical-intensive) farms emit at least 25% of the carbon dioxide (mostly from tractors, trucks, combines, transportation, cooling, freezing, and heating); 40% of the methane (mostly from massive herds of animals belching and farting, and manure ponds); and 96% of nitrous oxide (mostly from synthetic fertilizer manufacture and use, the millions of tons of animal manure from factory-farmed cattle herds, pig and poultry flocks, and millions of tons of sewage sludge spread on farms). Black carbon or soot comes primarily from older diesel engines, slash and burn agriculture, and wood cook stoves. Per ton, methane is 21 times more damaging, and nitrous oxide 310 times more damaging, as a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, when measured over a one hundred year period. Damage is even worse if you look at the impact on global warming over the next crucial 20-year period. Many climate scientists admit that they have previously drastically underestimated the dangers of the non-CO2 GHGs, including methane, soot, and nitrous oxide, which are responsible for at least 22% of global warming.

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric is deemphasized now and action isn’t being taken—the aff’s use of risk and fear is key

Romm 12 – Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 "Best Blogs of 2010." In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 "people who are reinventing America." Time named him a "Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger." Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT. (“Apocalypse Not: The Oscars, The Media And The Myth of ‘Constant Repetition of Doomsday Messages’ on Climate”, February 26, 2012, <http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/02/26/432546/apocalypse-not-oscars-media-myth-of-repetition-of-doomsday-messages-on-climate/#more-432546>)

\*We don’t like ableist language\*

The two greatest myths about global warming communications are 1) constant repetition of doomsday messages has been a major, ongoing strategy and 2) that strategy doesn’t work and indeed is actually counterproductive!

These myths are so deeply ingrained in the environmental and progressive political community that when we finally had a serious shot at a climate bill, the powers that be decided not to focus on the threat posed by climate change in any serious fashion in their $200 million communications effort (see my 6/10 post “Can you solve global warming without talking about global warming?“). These myths are so deeply ingrained in the mainstream media that such messaging, when it is tried, is routinely attacked and denounced — and the flimsiest studies are interpreted exactly backwards to drive the erroneous message home (see “Dire straits: Media blows the story of UC Berkeley study on climate messaging“)

The only time anything approximating this kind of messaging — not “doomsday” but what I’d call blunt, science-based messaging that also makes clear the problem is solvable — was in 2006 and 2007 with the release of An Inconvenient Truth (and the 4 assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and media coverage like the April 2006 cover of Time). The data suggest **that strategy measurably moved the public to become more concerned** about the threat posed by global warming (see recent study here).

You’d think it would be pretty obvious that **the public is not going to be concerned about an issue unless one explains why they should be concerned about an issue.** And the social science literature, including the vast literature on advertising and marketing, could not be clearer that only repeated messages have any chance of sinking in and moving the needle.

Because I doubt any serious movement of public opinion or mobilization of political action could possibly occur until these myths are shattered, I’ll do a multipart series on this subject, featuring public opinion analysis, quotes by leading experts, and the latest social science research.

Since this is Oscar night, though, it seems appropriate to start by looking at what messages the public are exposed to in popular culture and the media. It ain’t doomsday. Quite the reverse, climate change has been mostly an invisible issue for several years and the message of conspicuous consumption and business-as-usual reigns supreme.

The motivation for this post actually came up because I received an e-mail from a journalist commenting that the “constant repetition of doomsday messages” doesn’t work as a messaging strategy. I had to demur, for the reasons noted above.

But it did get me thinking about what messages the public are exposed to, especially as I’ve been rushing to see the movies nominated for Best Picture this year. I am a huge movie buff, but as parents of 5-year-olds know, it isn’t easy to stay up with the latest movies.

That said, good luck finding a popular movie in recent years that even touches on climate change, let alone one a popular one that would pass for doomsday messaging. Best Picture nominee The Tree of Life has been billed as an environmental movie — and even shown at environmental film festivals — but while it is certainly depressing, climate-related it ain’t. In fact, if that is truly someone’s idea of environmental movie, count me out.

The closest to a genuine popular climate movie was the dreadfully unscientific The Day After Tomorrow, which is from 2004 (and arguably set back the messaging effort by putting the absurd “global cooling” notion in people’s heads! Even Avatar, the most successful movie of all time and “the most epic piece of environmental advocacy ever captured on celluloid,” as one producer put it, omits the climate doomsday message. One of my favorite eco-movies, “Wall-E, is an eco-dystopian gem and an anti-consumption movie,” but it isn’t a climate movie.

I will be interested to see The Hunger Games, but I’ve read all 3 of the bestselling post-apocalyptic young adult novels — hey, that’s my job! — and they don’t qualify as climate change doomsday messaging (more on that later). So, no, the movies certainly don’t expose the public to constant doomsday messages on climate.

Here are the key points about what repeated messages the American public is exposed to:

The broad American public is exposed to virtually no doomsday messages, let alone constant ones, on climate change in popular culture (TV and the movies and even online). There is not one single TV show on any network devoted to this subject, which is, arguably, more consequential than any other preventable issue we face.

The same goes for the news media, whose coverage of climate change has collapsed (see “Network News Coverage of Climate Change Collapsed in 2011“). When the media do cover climate change in recent years, the overwhelming majority of coverage is devoid of any doomsday messages — and **many outlets still feature hard-core deniers**. Just imagine what the public’s view of climate would be if it got the same coverage as, say, unemployment, the housing crisis or even the deficit? When was the last time you saw an “employment denier” quoted on TV or in a newspaper?

The public is exposed to constant messages promoting business as usual and indeed idolizing conspicuous consumption. See, for instance, “Breaking: The earth is breaking … but how about that Royal Wedding?

Our political elite and intelligentsia, including MSM pundits and the supposedly “liberal media” like, say, MSNBC, hardly even talk about climate change and when they do, it isn’t doomsday. Indeed, there isn’t even a single national columnist for a major media outlet who writes primarily on climate. Most “liberal” columnists rarely mention it.

At least a quarter of the public chooses media that devote a vast amount of time to the notion that global warming is a hoax and that environmentalists are extremists and that clean energy is a joke. In the MSM, conservative pundits routinely trash climate science and mock clean energy. Just listen to, say, Joe Scarborough on MSNBC’s Morning Joe mock clean energy sometime.

The major energy companies bombard the airwaves with millions and millions of dollars of repetitious pro-fossil-fuel ads. The environmentalists spend far, far less money. As noted above, the one time they did run a major campaign to push a climate bill, they and their political allies including the president explicitly did NOT talk much about climate change, particularly doomsday messaging

Environmentalists when they do appear in popular culture, especially TV, are routinely mocked.

There is very little mass communication of doomsday messages online. Check out the most popular websites. General silence on the subject, and again, what coverage there is ain’t doomsday messaging. Go to the front page of the (moderately trafficked) environmental websites. Where is the doomsday?

If you want to find anything approximating even modest, blunt, science-based messaging built around the scientific literature, interviews with actual climate scientists and a clear statement that we can solve this problem — well, you’ve all found it, of course, but the only people who see it are those who go looking for it.

Of course, this blog is not even aimed at the general public. Probably 99% of Americans haven’t even seen one of my headlines and 99.7% haven’t read one of my climate science posts. And Climate Progress is probably the most widely read, quoted, and reposted climate science blog in the world.

Anyone dropping into America from another country or another planet who started following popular culture and the news the way the overwhelming majority of Americans do would get the distinct impression that nobody who matters is terribly worried about climate change. And, of course, they’d be right — see “The failed presidency of Barack Obama, Part 2.”

It is total BS that somehow the American public has been scared and overwhelmed by repeated doomsday messaging into some sort of climate fatigue. If the public’s concern has dropped — and public opinion analysis suggests it has dropped several percent (though is bouncing back a tad) — that is primarily due to the conservative media’s disinformation campaign impact on Tea Party conservatives and to the treatment of this as a nonissue by most of the rest of the media, intelligentsia and popular culture.

#### We don’t call people out—nothing in the 1AC makes the claim that people should die if they don’t adopt the Cuban model

### Heg

#### No endless interventions or “endless destruction”

Mandelbaum 11 (Michael Mandelbaum, A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; and Director, Project on East-West Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, “CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy,” Jan 2011) <http://www.cfr.org/publication/23828/cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on_renewing_america.html?cid=rss-fullfeed-cfr_90th_anniversary_series_on-011811&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+cfr_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed>

MANDELBAUM: I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think we're not going to do it again. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### Two reasons these turns aren’t amazing—

#### Not the same type of hegemony—we cooperate with non-democracies and create a more peaceful form of unilateralism that doesn’t result in violent lashout—that’s the Finnemore and Kupchan evidence

#### b) there’s no uniqueness for their turns—unilateralism doesn’t go away if you vote neg which means it’s try or die to move away from violence

#### It’s on balance good

Thomas P.M. Barnett 11 Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

It is worth first examining the larger picture: **We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, **with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its** relative and absolute **lack of mass violence**. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our **stunningly successful stewardship of global order** since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known**. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the **world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace**. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy**, the **persistent spread of human rights**, the liberation of women, **the doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly **10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP** **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. **¶** As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. **The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars.** That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude**, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity,** something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. **But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶** To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, **the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism.** America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, **setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.**

### The K

#### The affirmative should win if the results of the imagined policy action are good—any other interpretation moots 8 minutes of the 1AC and makes it impossible to get stable offense against the status quo or the kritik which internal link turns their education arguments

#### That’s specifically true in the context of trade in Latin America

Giordano and Li 12 – \*Paolo, PhD in Economics from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Lead Economist @ the Integratoin and Trade Sector of the IADB, \*\*Kun, Research Fellow @ IADB (“An Updated Assessment of the Trade and Poverty Nexus in Latin America,” p. 375-377)

Despite the move towards more open trade regimes, Latin American economies are still ¶ relatively closed to international trade. Under the pressure of globalisation, it is likely that in the ¶ coming years the region will need to open further and adjust to compete in an increasingly ¶ challenging global environment. Latin America being one of the most unequal regions of the ¶ world, the assessment of the trade and poverty nexus is crucial to devise policies aiming at ¶ better distributing the gains from trade. Latin America-specific research on this topic will ¶ provide policymakers and stakeholders with evidence necessary to underpin a debate which ¶ seems to be nurtured more by anxiety than rigorous knowledge. ¶ In this light, it is useful to refer to a few conclusions with the aim of building up a solid base ¶ for policy debates and future research.¶ There is a gap in the availability of methodologies to explore the link between macro policy ¶ reforms like trade liberalisation and micro-economic determinants of welfare and poverty. It is ¶ therefore crucial to invest in the generation of data and research techniques, to adapt the ¶ research agenda to the specificity of Latin America and to consider qualitative issues that are ¶ difficult to measure. Meanwhile, normative statements referring to the trade policy nexus should ¶ cautiously consider the limitations of current positive knowledge.¶ Trade openness, inequality and poverty are wide multidimensional concepts. Measuring and ¶ attributing causal relations among these variables without carefully qualifying the specific ¶ dimensions explored or the particular transmission mechanisms at play may be misleading. It is ¶ important to disentangle the specific dimension of the trade and poverty nexus from the wider ¶ debate on globalisation and financial integration, the competing concepts of relative and ¶ absolute inequality and the objective and subjective dimension of poverty and deprivation.¶ Despite the impossibility to rigorously and unambiguously assert that trade openness is ¶ conducive to growth and poverty reduction, the preponderance of evidence supports this ¶ conclusion. However, the majority of empirical macro studies also show that the impact of trade ¶ on growth and poverty is also generally small and that the causes of indigence are to be found ¶ elsewhere. But it is in fact extremely arduous to find evidence that supports the notion that trade ¶ protection is good for the poor. The question is therefore how to make trade and growth more ¶ pro-poor and not how to devise improbable alternatives to trade integration aiming at improving ¶ the livelihood of the poor.¶ Specific evidence on Latin America reveals that deductive generalisations of the neoclassical ¶ trade theory and global cross-country empirical studies may be of little help in 0-0-understanding ¶ the trade and poverty nexus in the region. Several factors may explain why the integration of ¶ Latin America into the global economy may not necessarily bring about rising wages of ¶ unskilled workers and poverty reduction. The most compelling arguments are related to the ¶ existence of rigidities in the labour markets, the historical pattern of protection that created rents ¶ in unskilled intensive sectors, the emergence of low wage countries such as China and India that ¶ shifts the comparative advantage of Latin American economies, and institutional factors that ¶ protract the effects of an initial unequal distribution of factor endowments against the poor.¶ Trade liberalisation may in fact be associated with rising inequality. But country case studies ¶ present contrasting indications. Although there is some evidence of rising inequality in the ¶ aftermath of trade opening, such as in the case of Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Chile, it ¶ seems that the specific effects of trade liberalisation are small or indirect. Skill-biased technical ¶ change, often directly related with the increase of foreign direct investment or with capital ¶ account liberalisation, seems to have a stronger explanatory power than trade liberalisation. ¶ There is also little evidence that trade opening has generated more informality. On the other ¶ hand, the case of Brazil, where trade liberalisation seems to have contributed to the reduction of ¶ wage inequality, is illustrative of the conditions under which trade reforms may have ¶ progressive distributive effects¶ The empirical analysis addressing the direct effect of trade integration on poverty reveals a ¶ similar landscape. Trade integration seems to be good for the poor but the effects are small. ¶ Generalisations should be taken with a great deal of caution because this is a domain where data ¶ may present considerable shortcomings. In any event it seems that foreign trade reforms are ¶ more important for poverty reduction than unilateral ones or than the national component of ¶ reciprocal trade reforms. The countries of the region may therefore expect further contributions ¶ of trade integration to poverty reduction, particularly from the liberalisation of the agriculture ¶ sector where the greatest pockets of residual protectionism are still concentrated. However, ¶ predicting ex ante the pro-poor effects of trade reforms is an extremely sensitive task highly¶ dependent on the quality of the data and the correct specification of the simulation instruments. ¶ It is hard to overstate the importance of strengthening the capacity of policymaking in this area.

#### The alternative fails and institutions are key—their theory can’t overcome habit

Hopf 10 – Ted Hopf has been a professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Ohio University and the University of Michigan. His main fields of interest are international relations theory, qualitative research methods, and identity. (“The logic of habit in International Relations”, June 2010, European Journal of International Relations 16:539, Sage Journals)

Social theorists from Weber to Bourdieu have argued that most humans most of the time act in the world habitually, not reflectively. Moreover, in the last 15 years cognitive neuroscientists have established that people regularly perceive, feel, and act before they think; we respond to the world without rational reflection. Nonetheless, habit is virtually absent from the study of international politics. Instead, we concentrate on the deliberate actions of agents. Either they are making rationalistic cost–benefit calculations about their choices, as stylized by the ‘logic of consequentialism’, or they are making choices with conscious reference to norms and rules that correspond to their identities, or according to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1998).1

We have been ignoring what most people do most of the time in their social lives.2 We have exaggerated actors’ agency, rationality, and uncertainty. We have underestimated the stability of patterns of cooperation and conflict in world politics, and mistaken their causes. We have created security and cooperation ‘dilemmas’ that are not dilemmas at all, but straightforward habitual routines of enmity and amity.

Despite intersubjective reality being the very heart of social constructivism, conventional constructivist scholarship in International Relations, with its concentration on consciously apprehended identities and deliberately contested norms, has ignored one of its foundational postulates. In doing so, it has privileged agency over constraining structures, and **exaggerated the ease with which change may occur in world politics**. Any efforts to change have to first overcome the power of habitual perceptions, emotions, and practices. The recent ‘practice turn’ in International Relations has stressed the non-reflective side of social order, but it has not yet appreciated habit’s role as a structural obstacle to social change. It also has not explored the relationship between habit, agency, rationality, and uncertainty in world politics. Where the logic of habit predominates, international relations have less agency, less rationality, and less uncertainty than other logics would lead us to expect.

In foregrounding the logic of habit, I am not arguing that consequentialism and appropriateness are absent, only that there are domains of world politics, especially areas of long-term relationships of cooperation and conflict, where we should expect habit, and not instrumental or normative rationality, to apply.

In the first section below, I explain what habits are, what they do, how they are acquired, and how they are broken. I combine a discussion of how habits have been conceptualized by a range of social theorists with the more narrow and precise findings of cognitive neuroscience. The latter provide the ‘nano-foundations’ for the logic of habit in IR.3 In the second section, I explore how the logic of habit relates to the other logics of social life: consequentialism, appropriateness, and, at much greater length, practice. I concentrate on the logic of practice because its advocates have recently advanced ideas most closely related to the logic of habit. But, in doing so, they have ignored habit’s power to perpetuate the status quo.

In the third section I explain the logic of habit’s unique take on rationality, uncertainty, and agency in IR theory, deduce testable hypotheses from the logic of habit, and show how their implications would manifest themselves in enduring cooperative and conflictual relationships between and among states. In particular I offer an understanding of security communities from the perspective of the logic of habit. I also elaborate some principles for research designs to assess the competing claims of the different logics of IR.

The social theory and neuroscience of habit

What are habits?4

Max Weber distinguished among four ‘orientations’ for social action: instrumental rationality, or Zweckrationalität; value rationality, or Wertrationalität; ‘affectual — especially emotional, through given affects and states of feeling’; and ‘traditional, through the habituation of long practice’ (Weber, 1968 [1925]: 12). Instrumental rationality entails cost–benefit calculations for any choice, or the logic of consequentialism. Value rationality implies reference to some norm when making a choice, or the logic of appropriateness. Social actions based on affect expect emotions and ‘feeling states’ to govern choice. The logic of habit implies choices made from ‘unreflectively utilized viewpoints’ (Weber, 1949: 112; see also Dewey, 1983 [1922]: 21–32, 124).

Cognitive neuroscience distinguishes habits, or ‘automatic cognitive processes’, from ‘conscious control processes’ (Wegner and Bargh, 1998: 459–462).5 Habits are unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless, that is, they do not consume limited cognitive processing capacity. Controlled processes are intentional and effortful (Snow, 2006: 546). Habits are located in the ‘automatic system’ of the brain, while control processes are in the ‘reflective system’ (Bargh, 1997; Evans, 2008: 257).6 The automatic system is responsible for perception, the reflective system for thought (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2004: 244).

What do habits do?

Habits both evoke and suppress actions. They imply actions by giving us ready-made responses to the world that we execute without thinking. They prevent other behavior by short-circuiting any need to think about what we are doing. So an infinitude of behaviors are effectively deleted from the available repertoire of possible actions. We do not apprehend what is out there, and then categorize it. Instead, what is perceived as reality is already pre-cooked in our heads. Habits produce both the awareness, and unawareness, of much of reality (Dewey, 1983 [1922]: 121).

One ready-made response habits offer are stereotypes (Wheeler and Fiske, 2005). Habits permit rapid, not necessarily accurate, categorizations of people and events (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2000: 60; Macrae et al., 1994; Wegner and Bargh, 1998: 472–473). Like schemas and scripts, stereotypes fill in information about the other actor that is missing from her actual behavior and make ambiguous evidence unambiguously supportive of the habitual categorization (Srull and Wyer, 1979; Winter and Uleman, 1984). Because people confuse easy categorizations with high validity, even ambiguous evidence is taken as highly diagnostic in determining what type a person is (Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg, 1996; Wegner and Bargh, 1998: 475). Because habitual stereotypes are automatically evoked, and not analyzed reflectively, we are unaware of their operation, creating a cognitive foundation for self-fulfilling prophecies. Unknowingly provoking the expected conduct from the stereotyped person, his behavior validates my habitual expectations (Snow, 2006: 547).

Habits and emotions are close associates; they are both automatic, not reflective. As Rose McDermott summarizes, ‘The brain’s structural makeup requires that emotional information exert an influence before, and sometimes instead of, higher-level cognitive functioning’ (McDermott, 2004: 692; see also Mercer, 2005: 92–99). There is an ‘automaticity of affect toward political leaders, groups, and issues’ which, like habit, precludes reflection (Cacioppo and Visser, 2003; Lodge and Taber, 2005). Since affect can manifest itself as trust in, or hostility toward, another country, cooperation and amity, or conflict and enmity, can be an automatic habitual emotional response, rather than an instrumental or normative calculation (Mercer, 2005: 95–97).

#### Util comes first—even if interventions are bad and violence hurts people, the equality of every life means you should default to saving the most of them

#### Perm do the plan and deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens

Stern and Druckman 2k (Paul, National Research Council and Daniel, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution – George Mason University, International Studies Review, Spring, p. 62-63)

Using several distinct research approaches or sources of information in conjunction is a valuable strategy for developing generic knowledge. This strategy is particularly useful for meeting the challenges of measurement and inference. The nature of historical phenomena makes controlled experimentation—the analytic technique best suited to making strong inferences about causes and effects—practically impossible with real-life situations. Making inferences requires using experimentation in simulated conditions and various other methods, each of which has its own advantages and limitations, but none of which can alone provide the level of certainty desired about what works and under what conditions. We conclude that debates between advocates of different research methods (for example, the quantitative-qualitative debate) are unproductive except in the context of a search for ways in which different methods can complement each other. Because there is no single best way to develop knowledge, the search for generic knowledge about international conflict resolution should adopt an epistemological strategy of triangulation, sometimes called “**critical** **multiplism**.”53 That is, it should use multiple perspectives, sources of data, constructs, interpretive frameworks, and modes of analysis to address specific questions on the presumption that research approaches that rely on certain perspectives can act as **partial correctives** for the limitations of approaches that rely on different ones. An underlying assumption is that robust findings (those that hold across studies that vary along several dimensions) engender more confidence than replicated findings (a traditional scientific ideal, but not practicable in international relations research outside the laboratory). When different data sources or methods converge on a single answer, one can have increased confidence in the result. When they do not converge, one can interpret and take into account the known biases in each research approach. A continuing critical dialogue among analysts using different perspectives, methods, and data could lead to an understanding that better approximates international relations than the results coming from any single study, method, or data source.

**Metaphysical or ontological prior questions fail and replicate their impacts**

Majid **Yar 2k**, Department of Sociology @ Lancaster University, ARENDT'S HEIDEGGERIANISM: CONTOURS OF A `POSTMETAPHYSICAL' POLITICAL THEORY?, Cultural Values Vol 1 Issue 1, Jstor

The first and perhaps most readily apparent difficulty of this 'postmetaphysical' discourse on the political is its reliance on an **overly synoptic and undifferentiated philosophical history as the basis of its 'diagnosis of the present'.** It depends above all else, wholeheartedly and unequivocally, upon the corpus of philosophical discourse for a characterisation of political, social and cultural experiences and practices. Following Heidegger's cue, there takes place a **questionable transposition of the history of philosophy onto the history of society**; the widest field of socio-cultural understandings, those implicated in the practices of politics, the living of socio-technological relations, etc., are 'read-off from what philosophy has had to say about those practices and relations. Granted, what is at stake for Heidegger and those who follow him is a specific (metaphysical, technological) understanding or revealing of Being, and such revealing takes place in/as language, and philosophy is one such language in which Being is revealed. Therefore, philosophical understanding is part and parcel of the way in which Being is disclosed. However, the problem here is that it [i.e. philosophy] is taken as the language, a **privileged locus** whose understandings are encapsulatory or **exhaustive** of a society's modes of comportment as such. To put this another way, the 'postmetaphysical' position takes modern philosophers at their word, **deferring to what philosophers have written** about the experience of modernity, believing that philosophers have captured the actuality of the many and diverse modes of being characteristic of a society.

This **affirmation of the philosophical reading of politics**, culture and society is **self-sustaining** in that **any 'empirical' inquiry is a priori rendered illegitimate** by its **'merely ontic' status** and the association of the 'sciences' with the very **metaphysical contamination** that the postmetaphysical position seeks to set aside. Nancy and Lacoue- Labarthe presciently acknowledge that 'To submit ... [a] phenomena to this sort of generalisation is clearly to **tear it from every empirical hold and from all empirical treatment**. We will be reproached for this' (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, p. 126). But they justify their submission of the political to a generalised philosophical treatment by asserting that 'The project of a theory or science of the political, with all its socio-anthropological baggage (and consequently, its philosophical presuppositions), now more than ever necessitates its own critique and the critique of its political function' (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, p. 109). This is a statement with which I would wholeheartedly agree. However, this does not entail that we abstain from all such inquiry, for to so suppose is to suppose that such inquiry takes no other form than by the ostensible and canonical precepts of 'science'. In other words, the cursory dismissal of the human and social sciences because their concepts and modus operandii 'necessarily derive from the philosophical field ... a field itself determined, that is to say, ancient, past, closed' (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, p. 109) - this gives one the impression of an insensitivity to the transformation of such inquiries in their relation to the 'philosophical field', the very field of 20th century 'continental philosophy' out of which the deconstructions and decentrings of the 'postmetaphysical turn' itself emerge. To think of the contemporary social and human sciences as merely recapitulating or repeating the suspect philosophical gestures of modern metaphysical thinking (rigidified subject-object distinctions, truth as subjective representationalism, a belief in a transparent and final vocabulary, a priori assumption of a self-identical Cartesian cogito, etc.) is to fail to apprehend the ways in which such sciences have learnt from the continental philosophical tradition, engendering interpretive, phenomenological, hermeneutic, critical and reflexive modes of investigation (McCarthy, 1991, pp. 114-15). Nevertheless, we see that on the basis of this obdurate **refusal of substantive socio-historical study of the political**, what remains is a pseudo-politological and -sociological analysis, insofar as the postmetaphysical discourse proffers a narrative about the emergence and configuration of the experience of modernity, yet this narrative remains resolutely (one might even say solipsistically) within the realm of a specifically philosophical ( inter)textuality. If by 'metaphysics' we mean a particular economy of presencing, one prevalent in or characteristic of a period or epoch as a whole, then we can't simply confine ourselves to reading it off from philosophical discourse - we must engage in a substantive and differentiated historical-hermeneutic investigation of the modes of comportment which take place in the lived relations and practices of a society; macro or meta level claims require commensurately exhaustive investigations to support them. We might note here that the promise of an experientially and 'factically' grounded investigation of human being in- the-world (i.e. the existential analytic of Being and Time) isn't sustained and developed, but rather (regrettably in my view) gives way in Heidegger's writings to a 'history of Being' as the consolidation of the metaphysico-technological, an account which relies either upon commentary on philosophical texts (e.g. the Nietzsche lectures) or upon modern philosophical interpretations as the basis for determining the 'essence of the modern age' (e.g. the Cartesian stipulation of man as 'the relational centre of that which is as such' is conflated into the claim that modern human beings experience and live in the world in such a way as to constitute themselves as the relational centre of that which is as such; these are clearly not the same; the slippage here is that a philosophical discourse is taken to be an adequate expression of what Being is at a particular time, in a society and culture as a whole), (Villa, 1996, p.178; Heidegger, 1977, p. 128; Rorty, 1992, p. 219).15

We might note here that this **failure to deliver on the initial promise of a substantive analysis of human experience and practice** was instrumental in Marcuse's parting of ways with Heidegger. Marcuse studied with Heidegger from 1928-1932, published a number of essays in a strongly Heideggerian register, as well as his Habilitationschrift dealing with the ontological groundings of Hegel's theory of historicity. He felt that Being and Time offered the way into a philosophically informed social analysis of 'actual human existence, of human beings and their world', and thus could be fruitfully connected with the Marxist materialist project (Marcuse, 1988, p. 96). It is Marcuse's dissatisfaction with

Heidegger's **'false concreteness'**, his phenomenology's **non-engagement with the specificity of contemporary socio-historical situations and the philosophical 'fencing off from the social and historical sciences** (a tendency which aggregates after Being and Time), which draws Marcuse away from Heidegger and toward the Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts (not published until 1932) (McCarthy, 1991, pp. 83-96). These difficulties in the Heideggerian standpoint, highlighted by the Frankfurt School theorists, retain their salience. To the extent to which **'postmetaphysical' accounts of the political follow this Heideggerian narrative and strategy, they can be said to reproduce its flaws.**

A corrective for this abstraction from the 'factual' grounds of political life might be discerned from within Arendt's own oeuvre. We can see that while there is a tendency in some of Arendt's writings to reproduce the abstract and schematic Kulturkritik of modernity typified by Heidegger's history of metaphysics, there is a counter-tendency in works such as On Revolution and Origins of Totalitarianism which seeks to offer distinctions and judgements by starting from the historical specificity of particular events. Yet closer examination reveals that the treatment of such events tends to proceed by way of an 'idealising abstraction' commensurate with a pre-established definition of the 'authentic' political in its 'pure' or 'essential' form. Thus, for example, the founding of the American republic is 'elevated to the status of myth', rendered as the archetype of the act of instauration which for Arendt is the definition of authentic politics. Historians have rightly pointed out the discrepancies between Arendt's idealisation and the realities presented by historical research (Kielmansegg, 1995, pp. 2-3). It would appear that Arendt's attentiveness to the 'facts' and specificities of political events is undermined or overwhelmed by a prefiguration of 'the political' which provides the criteriological basis in terms of which all 'historical events' are re-narrated. Indeed, the very insistence upon proceeding from a conception of what constitutes the authentically political, prior to the specific historical and social configurations and articulations of political practices, sits uncomfortably with a commitment to eschewing philosophical-metaphysical 'essentialisms'.

A second, and not unrelated difficulty, is a **causal attribution to philosophy in relation to politics**, culture and society. That is, the tendency is not simply to attribute philosophical figurations of the political to the political experiences of actual social beings, but also to **depict those philosophical interpretations as standing in a determining relation to the culture and society as a whole.** As Heidegger declaims at the beginning of 'The Age of the World Picture', 'Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed [emphasis added]' (Heidegger, 1977, p. 115). 'Metaphysics', as an 'interpretation', is the basis upon which an age is formed. The 'interpretation' adduced here, let us be clear, is that of philosophy. Hence, for Arendt, the emergence of philosophy's metaphysical discourse on the political, its figuration of the political in terms of a dualistic metaphysical ontology, in terms of theoretical models of truth, and so on, rather than in terms of doxical opinion, agonism and performativity etc., - this **philosophical figuration** is taken as a **disaster for political life**. Yet this disastrous consequence only follows from the philosophical refiguration if we **accord philosophical understanding a determinative or prescriptive role**, in that it has the power to efface and override the existing understandings that political actors might have. The 'onto-theological' or 'onto-typological' tradition is taken to permeate Western science, culture, and politics as a whole; the language of metaphysics is held to be central to constituting the entire range of human possibilities (McCarthy, 1991, p. 102; Rorty, 1984, p. 3, pp. 15-6; Rorty, 1998, p. 45; also, Rorty, 1991). As Richard Rorty puts it: 'there is something called 'philosophy' or 'metaphysics' which is central to our culture and has been **radiating evil influences outward'** (Rorty, 1984, pp. 18-9). In short, the 'postmetaphysical' discourse on the political 'presupposes a prior determination of the political as the practical effectuation of the philosophical' (Fraser, 1984, p. 136). This casts philosophy in a relation to the political as both villain and hero.

First **philosophy qua metaphysics is the party responsible for the parlous state of the modern political, the cause of its pathological degradation into a totalitarian form of relation toward Being and beings**. Then philosophy **charges itself with the responsibility of redeeming the political**, by way of philosophy's self-transformation into a postphilosophical, literary-poetic 'thinking'. What is missed here is the possibility that **the political never did mirror or actualise the metaphysicians' understanding of Being**; that for political life, it might well have been 'business as usual', largely **indifferent to philosophy's discourse**. From the standpoint of political beings it might be claimed that they **never have lived their relations in the way in which philosophers' discourses figured them.** Consequently, there is **no need to 'breach a wholly other politics' to lead them back from an oblivion** which **only ever existed as part of philosophical manifestos**.

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Hence there is no necessity to lead political beings back to something primordial or essential from which they have supposedly departed - this departure, or 'forgetting', is characteristic **only of philosophy's turn to metaphysics, not of the field of political practice.** I'm not necessarily claiming that this is the case, that there is a profound disjunction between the comportment toward humans and other entities envisioned by modern philosophy on the one hand, and that to be found in the understandings of our political culture and the practices of political life on the other. The point is, that this a question for substantive inquiry; if we want to say something about the way in which the modern political reveals the Being of beings (technologically, coercively, forgettingly, etc.) this is something which has to be investigated. The 'postmetaphysical' critique of political modernity assumes convergence or identity by mapping philosophical renditions onto the culture as a whole, and what is more, makes philosophy responsible for that convergence via its determining influence. If we insist on proceeding in this way, **we might get our 'diagnosis of the present', and any attendant 'prescription' for our ailing political life, rather alarmingly wrong**.

Now these aforementioned objections are significant not only with respect to the analytical adequation or otherwise of the account offered, but also **in terms of practical consequences**: that is, the **possibility of politics implied by this critical rendition of the political**. The **totalising and undifferentiated character** of the critique of political modernity implies an equally generalised nugatory stance toward the sum of existing political institutions and practices (as 'grounded' in the 'metaphysical essence' of the age, a technological reduction of beings to 'standing reserve', and so on). **Commitment to this generalised schema results in difficulty in making nuanced and differentiated judgements about current political formations**. To cite just one example: Claude Lefort, in his paper "The Question of Democracy', offers an analysis of the political present in terms of the difference between the closed character of totalitarianism and the 'open space' of democracy (Lefort, 1988). Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe have responded to this by questioning the opposition between 'totalitarianism' and 'democracy', introducing a concept of 'soft totalitarianism' to characterise Western liberal democracies, and thereby to establish an underlying continuum between these political forms which are ostensibly taken to be antithetical. This continuity or contiguity called 'totalitarianism' is, of course, **the closure of the political under the aegis of the metaphysical technological**, which **'grounds' all political forms in modernity at the completion of metaphysics**. 'Totalitarianism' is the totalitarianism of metaphysical violence and closure (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997, pp. 126-8; Critchley, 1993, pp. 78-82). This is clearly redolent of Heidegger's assertions to the effect that Americanism, Bolshevism and National Socialism are in essence not very different, that is they are all dominated by Gestell as the actualisation of Western metaphysics, now extended to global reach (Heidegger, 1993, p. 244; Heidegger, 1981, pp. 55-6). The point here is not that the concept of 'soft totalitarianism' is in itself uninteresting; similar accounts of the underlying logics of domination in modernity have been a mainstay of socio-political and cultural critiques from the Frankfurt School to Foucault, and before and beyond. The issue here is that, on the subsumption of political modernity to an overarching history of Being qua metaphysics, **very real and critically important moral and political distinctions between political forms and practices are levelled-out**, as these distinctions are recuperated back into a general and global account (parenthetically, an anachronism - in the age beyond grand narratives, the grandest of narratives ...); 'all political acts and all political systems are conceptually levelled into so many moments of the intensification of our technological existence' (White, 1991, p. 39; Wolin, 1990, pp. 160-9; Beistegui, 1998, p. 86). This difficulty in terms of differentiation holds out problems for such an account as a **facilitator in the formulation of political judgements and strategies**; one need not be a mere apologist for 'actually existing Western liberal democracies' to insist upon the value of a more refined and discriminating set of distinctions between political formations.

Similarly, we must consider the **consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics**, in terms of what is **practically excluded by this rethinking**. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the **fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognisable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day**. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the **suspension of engagement with the existing content of political agendas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics**. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other polities'. The former **suspends politics indefinitely**, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvantage, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [2] Arendt's pronouncement at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos. The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and agendas are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby **part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being**, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that **the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'**. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, **exiled from the political sphere** of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, **this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process**.

#### Objectivity is possible—statistics, empirics, etc solve

Rowland ‘95

[Robert. Prof Comm Kansas. “In Defense of Rational Argument: A Pragmatic Justification of Argumentation Theory and Response to the Postmodern Critique” Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol 28 N4. 1995. Ebsco//GBS-JV]

The first step in developing a justifiable theory of rational argument that can account for the epistemological and axiological attacks is to recognize the performative contradiction at the heart of the postmodern critique. Postmodernists rely on rational argument in order to attack rational argument and they consistently claim that their positions are in some way superior to those of their modernist opponents. Writing of post-structuralism, Amanda Anderson notes "the incommensurability between its epistemological stance and its political aims, between its descriptions and its prescriptions, between the pessimism of its intellect and, if not the optimism, at least the intrusiveness of its moral and political will" (1992, 64).¶ The performative contradiction at the heart of postmodernism is nowhere more evident than in the epistemological critique of modernism. The two most important points made by postmodernists in relation to epistemology are that humans can understand the world only through their symbols and that there is no means of using "reality" to test a symbolic description. Advocates of traditional approaches to rationality have not been able to satisfactorily answer these positions, precisely because they seem to be "true" in some sense. This "truth," however, suggests that a theory of rational argument may be salvageable. If postmodernists can defend their views as in some sense "truer" than those of their modernist opponents, then there must be some standard for judging "truth" that can withstand the postmodern indictment. That standard is pragmatic efficacy in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a given problem.¶ Both modernists and postmodernists generally assume that truth and fact are equivalent terms. Thus, a "true" statement is one that is factually correct in all circumstances. By this standard, of course, there are no totally "true" statements. However, if no statement can be proved factually true, then a focus on facts is an inappropriate standard for judging truth.¶ I suggest that knowledge and truth should be understood not as factual statements that are certain, but as symbolic statements that function as useful problem-solving tools. When we say that a view is true, we really mean that a given symbolic description consistently solves a particular problem. Thus, the statement "the sun will come up tomorrow" can be considered "true," despite ambiguities that a postmodernist might point to in regard to the meaning of sun or tomorrow, because it usefully and consistently solves a particular epistemic problem.¶ The standard for "truth" is pragmatic utility in fulfilling a purpose in relation to a particular problem. A true statement is one that "works" to solve the problem. Both the nature of the problem and the arguer's purpose in relation to that problem infiuence whether a given statement is viewed as true knowledge. This explains why biological researchers and physicians often seem to have different definitions of truth in regard to medical practice. The researcher is concerned with fully understanding the way that the body works. His or her purpose dictates application of rigorous standards for evaluating evidence and causation. By contrast, the physician is concerned with treating patients and therefore may apply a much lower standard for evaluating new treatments. The pragmatic theory of argument I am defending draws heavily on the work of William James, who believed that "the only test of probable truth is what works" (1982, 225). Alan Brinton explains that for jEunes "the ultimate question of truth is a question about the concepts and their fruitfulness in serving the purposes for which they were created and imposed. Ideas are true insofar as they serve these purposes, and false insofar as they fail to do so" (1982, 163). Some contemporary pragmatists take a similar view. For example, Nicholas Rescher writes in relation to methodology that "the proper test for the correctness or appropriateness of anything methodological in nature is plainly and obviously posed by the paradigmatically pragmatic questions: Does it work? Does it attain its intended purposes?" (1977, 3). Similarly, Celeste Condit Railsback argues that "truth is . . . relative to the language and purposes of the persons who are using it" (1983, 358-59). At this point, someone like Derrida might argue that while the pragmatic approach accounts for the symbolic nature of truth, it does not deal with the inability of humans to get at reality directly. Although the postmodern critique denies that humans can directly experience "the facts," it does not deny that a real-world exists.¶ Thus, a pragmatist endorses a given scientific theory because the symbolic description present in that theory does a better job than its competitors of fulfilling a set of purposes in a given context. Because it fulfills those purposes, we call the theory "true." We cannot attain knowledge about "the facts," but we can test the relative adequacy of competing problem-solving statements against those facts. Michael Redhead, a professor of history and philosophy of science at Cambridge University, notes that "we can always conjecture, but there is some control. The world kicks back" (in Peterson 1992,175; emphasis added). Knowledge is not about "facts." It is about finding symbolic descriptions of the world that work, that is, avoiding nature's kicks in fulfilling a given purpose.¶ The foregoing suggests that a principled pragmatic theory of argument sidesteps the postmodern critique. Argumentation theory ¶ should be understood as a set of pragmatic rules of thumb about the kinds of symbolic statements that effectively solve ¶ problems. These statements exist at varying levels of generality. A consistency principle , for example, is really a rule of thumb stating something like "All other things being equal, consistent symbolic descriptions are more likely to prove useful for solving a particular problem in relation to a given purpose than are inconsistent descriptions." Other principles are linked to narrower purposes in more specific contexts. Thus, the standards for evaluating arguments in a subfield of physics will be tied to the particular purposes and problems found in that subfield. The key point is that all aspects of a theory of argument can be justified pragmatically, based on their value for producing useful solutions to problems.¶ A pragmatic theory of argument can be understood as operating at three levels, all of which are tied to functionality. At the first or definitional level, argument is best understood as a kind of discourse or interaction in which reasons and evidence are presented in support of a claim. Argument as a symbolic form is valued based on its ability to deal with problems; the business of argument is problem solving. At a second or theoretical level, what Toulmin would call fieldinvariant, general principles of rational argument are justified pragmatically based on their capacity to solve problems. Thus, tests of evidence, general rules for describing argument, standards relating to burden of proof or presumption, and fallacies, all can be justified pragmatically based on the general problem-solving purpose served by all argument. For example, the requirement that claims must be supported with evidence can be justified as a general rule of thumb for distinguishing between strong and weak (that is, useful and useless) arguments. Certainly, there are cases in which unsupported assertions are "true" in some sense. However, the principle that any claim on belief should be supported with evidence of some type is a functional one for distinguishing between claims that are likely to be useful and those that are less likely to be useful.¶ At a third level, that of specific fields or subfields, principles of argumentation are linked to pragmatic success in solving problems in the particular area (see Rowland 1982). Thus, for instance, the rules of evidence found in the law are linked directly to the purposes served by legal argument. This explains why the burden of proof in a criminal trial is very different from that found in the civil law. The purpose of protecting the innocent from potential conviction requires that a higher standard of proof be applied in this area than elsewhere.¶ The pragmatic perspective I have described is quite different from that of interpretive pragmatists such as Richard Rorty (1979, 1982, 1985, 1987) and Stanley Fish (1980, 1989a, 1989b). Rorty, while denying the existence of legitimate formal or content-based standards for "proof" (1982,277), endorses a processual epistemology based on "the idea of [substituting] 'unforced agreement' for that of 'objectivity' " (41-42). Janet Home summarizes Rorty's views, noting that "the difference between 'certified knowledge' and 'mere belief is based upon intersubjective agreement rather than correspondence" (1989, 249). By contrast. Fish grounds reason in the practices of particular "interpretive communities" (1989b, 98). In this view, "Particular facts are firm or in question insofar as the perspective . . . within which they emerge is firmly in place, settled" (Fish 1989a, 308).¶ Unfortunately, a theory of argumentation cannot be salvaged merely by grounding reason in conversational practice or community assent. If there are no agreed upon standards, then how does one "rationally" test a claim intersubjectively or in process? Fish and Rorty beg the question when they ground reason in community and conversational process. Unlike Rorty and Fish, who reject the ideas of "truth" and "knowledge," I argue that those concepts must be redefined in relation to problem solving.¶ The pragmatic theory of argument that I have advanced provides a principled means of choosing among competing alternatives, regardless of the context. One always should ask whether or not a particular symbolic description of the world fulfills its purposes. In so doing, methodological principles for testing knowledge claims, such as tests of evidence, fallacies, and more precise field standards, can be justified, and then they can be applied within the conversation or by the community. The approach, therefore, provides standards to be applied in Rorty's process or by Fish's community and avoids the tautology that otherwise confronts those approaches. The perspective neatly avoids the problems associated with modernism, but also provides a principled approach to argument that does not lead to relativism.¶ In defense of rational argument¶ When argument is viewed as a pragmatic problem-solving tool, the power of the postmodern critique largely dissipates. At the most basic level, a pragmatic theory of argument is based on premises such as the following:¶ 'Statements supported by evidence and reasoning are more likely to be useful for satisfactorily solving a problem than ones that lack that support.¶ 'Consistent arguments are more likely to be generalizable than inconsistent ones.¶ 'Experts are more likely to have useful viewpoints about technical questions tied to a particular field than nonexperts. These statements are not "true" in the factual sense, but they are universally recognized as useful, a point that is emphasized in the work of even the most committed postmodernist. Even someone like Derrida demands that his opponents support their claims with evidence and consistent reasoning. In so doing, Derrida clearly recognizes the functional utility of general standards for testing argument form and process.¶ Arguing should be understood as a pragmatic process for locating solutions to problems. The ultimate justification of argument as a discipline is that it produces useful solutions. Of course, not all arguments lead to successful solutions because the world is a complex place and the people who utilize the form/process are flawed. However, the general functional utility of argument as a method of ¶ invention or discovery and the method of justification is undisputed. The pragmatic approach to argument also provides a means of answering the axiological objections to traditional reason. Initially, the view that argument is often a means of enslaving or disempowering people is based on a misunderstanding of how argument as a form of discourse functions. In fact, the danger of symbolic oppression is less applicable to argument as a type of symbol use than to other forms. Argument tells us how to solve problems. It can be a force for enslavement only to the degree that a successful problem-solution is enslaving. This is a rare event in any society grounded in democratic ethics.¶ Additionally, argument as a form and process is inherently person-respecting because in argument it is not status or force that matters, but only the reasoning (see Brockriede 1972). In a pure argumentative encounter, it does not matter whether you are President of the United States or a college junior; all that is relevant is what you have to say. Of course, this ideal is rarely realized, but the principle that humans should test their claims against standards of argumentation theory that are tied to pragmatic problem solving (and not base conclusions on power) is one that recognizes the fundamental humanity in all people.¶ Furthermore, argument is one of the most important means of protecting society from symbolic oppression. Argument as an internal process within an individual and external process within society provides a method of testing the claims of potential oppressors. Therefore, training in argument should be understood as a means of providing pragmatic tools for breaking out of terministic or disciplinary prisons.¶ Against this view, it could be argued that pragmatism, because of its "practical" bent, inevitably degenerates into "hegemonic instrumental reason" in which technocratic experts control society. In Eclipse of Reason, Max Horkheimer takes the position that "in its instrumental aspect, stressed by pragmatism," reason "has become completely harnessed to the social process. Its operational value, its role in the domination of men and nations has been made the sole criterion" (1947, 21). Later, he notes that "pragmatism is the counterpart of modern industrialism for which the factory is the prototype of human existence" (50).¶ The claims that pragmatism reduces reason to a mere instrument of production or leads to undemocratic technocratic control of society are, however, misguided. Initially, it is worth noting that Horkeimer's aim is not to indict rationality per se, but to focus on the inadequacy of a purely instrumental form of rationality, which he labels "subjective reason." Near the conclusion of Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer defends "objective reason": "This concept of truth—the adequation of name and thing—inherent in every genuine philosophy, enables thought to withstand if not to overcome the demoralizing and mutilating effects of formalized reason" (1947, 180). The goal of this essay, to develop a theory of rational argument that can withstand the postmodern indictment, is quite consistent with Horkheimer's view that humans need "objective reason" in order to "unshackle . . . independent thought" and oppose "cynical nihilism" (127, 174). While there can be no purely "objective reason," field-invariant and field-dependent principles of argumentation can be justified pragmatically to serve the aims that Horkheimer assigns to that form.¶ Moreover, a pragmatic theory of argument should not be confused with a decision-making approach based on mere practicality or self-interest. Principles of argument are justified pragmatically, that is, because they work consistently to solve problems. But after justification, the invariant and relevant field-dependent principles may be used to test the worth of any argument and are not tied to a simple utilitarian benefit/loss calculus. The misconception that a pragmatic theory of truth is tied to a simplistic instrumentalism is a common one. John Dewey notes, for instance, that William James's reference to the "cash value" of reasoning was misinterpreted by some "to mean that the consequences themselves of our rational conceptions must be narrowly limited by their pecuniary value" (1982, 33). In fact, pragmatism "concerns not the nature of consequences but the nature of knowing" (Dewey 1960,331). Or as James himself put it, "The possession of true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable instruments of action" (1948, 161). Pragmatism "is a method only," which "does not stand for any special result" (James 1982, 213), but that method can be used to justify principles of argument that in turn can be used to check the excesses of instrumental reason. Moreover, a pragmatic approach to argument is self-correcting. According to James, pragmatism "means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretense of finality in truth" (213). Dewey makes the same point when he claims that pragmatic theory involves "the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action" (1917,63). Nor does pragmatism necessarily lead to expert domination. A pragmatic argumentation theory endorses deference to the opinion of experts only on questions for which the expert possesses special knowledge relevant to a particular problem. And even on such issues, the views of the expert would be subject to rigorous testing. It would be quite unpragmatic to defer to expert opinion, absent good reasons and strong evidence.¶ The previous analysis in no way denies the risks associated with technical reason. It is, however precisely because of such risks that a principled pragmatic theory of argument is needed. Given that we live in an advanced technological society, it is inevitable that technical reason will play a role. Postmodernism points to the dangers of technical reason, but provides no means of avoiding those risks. A pragmatic theory of argument, by contrast, justifies principles of rationality that can be used to protect society from the nihilistic excesses of a purely instrumental reason.¶ ¶

**Heg decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

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First the absurdity: A few of the most over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did indeed promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. **It was a nutty concept then**, and it **remains a nutty concept today**. But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ Meanwhile, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be. So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But **the "evil" of the Washington Consensus** only yielded the **most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, **and their record on economic development was painfully transparent**: **Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer**. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- **after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but the historical sequence is undeniable: **With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared. It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. **Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, but we made the effort because, in our heart of hearts, we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of the War on Terror is that its operational requirements actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But the end result is clear: **We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era**.¶ But, of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster** if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the **greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen,** but also the **greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen**. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China, whose growing strength upsets us so much, then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come. ¶ As always, **the choice is ours**.

## 1AR

### Climate

#### Turns the k – it changes value structures that is a prerequisite to the alt

**Dyer 8** [Dr. H.C. Dyer, School of Politics & International Studies (POLIS) @ University of Leeds, “The Moral Significance of 'Energy Security' and 'Climate Security” Paper presented at WISC 2nd Global International Studies Conference, ‘What keeps us apart, what keeps us together? International Order, Justice, Values’ <http://www.wiscnetwork.org/ljubljana2008/getpaper.php?id=60>]

There is already considerable concern and cooperative activity, but it must also cope with predominately structural obstacles. Beyond the practical problem of coping with existing structures, or changing them, is the deeper problem of assuming foundational points of reference for any given structural reality such that challenging or changing it is difficult or impossible. So there is an intellectual, or attitudinal, hurdle to leap at the outset – we’d have to accept that some deeply held assumptions are simply not viable (sustainable), and learn to let them go. I have suggested elsewhere that while ‘perspectives on politics in the absence of immutable external foundations may be quite widely accepted… there is a great temptation in public discourses to deal with uncertainty by positing certainties, and to play fundamentalist trump cards of different kinds’ (Dyer, 2008). Switching from one foundational reference to another is not likely to work, and the anti-foundational perspective taken here suggests a pragmatic approach to developing the most effective social practices as we learn them, and adjusting structures to support them. An institutional context illustrates the discourse, in so far as ‘some controversial principles, such as whether to approach from an anthropocentric perspective or from a biocentric approach, or whether the viewpoint was from the individual or community, were the focus of considerable debate’. Not surprisingly, there is an air of realism about the application of ethical principles on renewable energy: ‘although a normative declaration would be nice, it was not feasible in the current political environment’ (UNESCO 2007; 7). The pragmatism is, nevertheless, appropriate since there is no progress to be made by assuming that an appreciation of the moral significance of energy and climate security only bears on abstractions – the point is that the underlying values reflected in political agendas should be flushed out, and the most appropriate values promoted and acted upon in a pragmatic fashion as interests. For example, it was noted that ‘barriers to renewable energy systems were institutional, political, technical and financial’ and also that there is ‘potential conflict between bioregional, potentially unstable energy systems and countries’ desires for energy independence and self-reliance’; this suggests the need for a ‘global eco-ethics’ (UNESCO 2007; 8). Pragmatism is inherent in thinking through the moral significance of such challenges: ‘From the ethical point of view, nuclear power presented many problems at each point of the complex supply chain, including uranium mining, enrichment, and risk management in a functioning plant. It was a highly centralized and state-controlled source of energy that did not promote participatory democracy’. It can also be seen that ‘nuclear and fossil-fuel based power also triggered international conflicts’. By contrast, ‘renewable energies such as solar, wind, small hydro, biomass, geothermal and tidal energy are often decentralized and can be used in remote areas without a solid energy supply system’ (UNESCO 2007; 8-9). The moral significance of energy security and climate security dilemmas is that they cause us to see change as a challenge, rather than impossible; a challenge to be met by **reconsidering our value-orientations** – which changes everything. Elsewhere I’ve noted that goals which the state purports to serve (health, wealth, security) are seen differently in an environmental light, and this could lead to substantial change in political practices (Dyer, 2007). Another pragmatist, John Dewey, ‘argued that the public interest was to be continuously constructed through the process of free, cooperative inquiry into the shared good of the democratic community’ and Minteer suggests that this is a necessary approach ‘in making connections between normative arguments and environmental policy discourse’ (Minteer, 2005). This reflects Hayward’s argument that environmental values are supported by enlightened human interests, and furthermore this link must exist to promote ecological goods, and that consequently there are serious implications in fully integrating environmental issues into our disciplinary concerns (Hayward, 1998). I’ve argued before that environmental politics dislodges conventional understandings of moral and political agency, and in ‘this wider socio-political-economic context, *ecological* significance may be the determining factor in the end’ (Dyer, 2007). Hargrove (1989) makes an argument for anthropocentric, aesthetic sources of modern environmental concern by identifying attitudes that constrained (‘idealism’, ‘property rights’) and supported (scientific and aesthetic ideals) our environmental perspectives. If this argument doesn’t stretch us much beyond ourselves, there is no reason these anthropocentric orientations couldn’t be built upon as a foundation for more specifically ecocentric perspectives. The key here is to identify the underlying ‘security’ assumptions which thwart efforts to cope with energy and climate issues coherently and effectively, and to advocate those assumptions that serve genuine long-term human security interests (inevitably, in an ecological context). In this way can we take stock of the existing structures that constrain and diminish human agency – while conceiving of those that would liberate and secure it in sustainable ways. As the reality of the situation slowly dawns on us, various moral, political, economic and social actors are beginning to consider and test new strategies for coping – the real question is whether they are just playing to beat the clock, or if they’ve stopped long enough to reconsider the rules and purposes of the strategic context in which they act. *'Security' as cause and effect of a moral turn* Security is central to understandings of the responsibilities of states, even definitional in their self-conception as defenders of the nation, with moral obligations to their own population which include defending them from external threats of all kinds (even if threats to nationals commonly emanate from their own state, per Booth’s ‘protection racket’, 1995). Security is usually the first concern of individuals as well, even extending to protective self-sacrifice (if sometimes greed or pleasure usurps this priority). The boundaries of concern and felt responsibility for security are nevertheless potentially flexible, and moral obligations may vary over time and space (who’s included, who’s not; when, where). The rationale for those obligations may now be extending over wider ranges of time and space, especially within an ecological perspective on how ‘security’ might be obtained. In this way, alertness to the security implications of climate and energy drives moral development, while at the same time a developed sense of moral obligation prompts a recasting of these issues in more urgent security terms. The insecurity of the *status quo* with respect to both energy and climate is enough to warrant serious consideration of how relative security might be obtained, and yet the most obvious dimension of insecurity is the collective failure to plan and act for the inevitable change that will be forced upon us, sooner or later. At every periodic assessment it seems sooner, rather than later, as IPCC and other government reports confirm our worst fears and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists sets the doomsday clock ever nearer to midnight. On the assumption that justice and equity will underwrite the feasibility of any international climate strategies, Grasso (2007) attempts to ‘identify a pluralistic normative ethical framework for climate mitigation and adaptation’ which includes ‘the criterion of lack of human security’ as regards the allocation of adaptation resources. The pursuit of any meaningful energy and climate security policy will require anticipation of future post-carbon scenarios. In offering a convincing perspective on ‘the age of petroleum’ as merely a recent blip in the long run of human energy supply (until the late 19th century provided by biomass and animate labour, and from the 21st century by renewables) the Nuclear Energy Agency argues that the ‘critical path structure’ should include ‘concurrent risk, economic, and environmental impact analyses… for all technologies and proposed actions for the transition to a post-petroleum economy’ (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2004; 37). While nuclear power remains under consideration, and hydrogen technology emerges as a potential portable fuel (though electricity intensive in production), there are many more positive solutions to the challenge. The alternatives to fossil fuels clearly exist, though it ‘will take a new industrial revolution’ (Scheer, 2002) or an ‘energy revolution’ (Geller, 2002). A wide range of innovations include ‘a fuel cell battery that runs on virtually any sugar source’ (*African Technology Development Forum* 27 March 2007). The *Renewables 2007 Global Status Report* (REN21) offers evidence of ‘the undeterred growth of electricity, heat, and fuel production capacities from renewable energy sources, including solar PV, wind power, solar hot water/heating, biofuels, hydropower, and geothermal’. **Heinberg** notes that the 21st century ushered in an era of declines, in a number of crucial parameters: Global oil, natural gas and coal extraction; Yearly grain harvests; Climate stability; Population; Economic growth; Fresh water; Minerals and ores, such as copper and platinum. ‘To adapt to this profoundly different world, we must begin now to make radical changes to our attitudes, behaviors and expectations’ *– h*e seeks to address ‘the cultural, psychological and practical changes we will have to make as nature rapidly dictates our new limits’ (**Heinberg,** *2007)*. Thus moral issues arise as the idea of a post-petroleum economy gains new currency as a security issue. Decades ago, conventional intergovernmental bureaucracies (e.g. FAO, 1982, ‘Planning for the post-petroleum economy’) were addressing what now seems a novel and urgent issue, perhaps because the sense of urgency or emergency has re-emerged in the confluence of energy and climate concerns. Both producers and consumers of energy have already taken some steps to reflect concern with energy and climate insecurity, by experimenting with different practices (recycling, improving efficiency, slowly introducing new technologies, attempting to manage the energy situation collectively, etc), and yet a remaining element of denial is reflected in a slow pace of change limited to the margins rather than the centre of planning. It seems fairly clear that maintaining current assumptions about economic growth while addressing climate change will at the very least require prompt application of new technologies and a regulatory and fiscal environment to support them (Sachs, J., 2008). This implies a radical shift of practices, and it remains to be seen whether currently familiar assumptions about economic growth will survive. Dabelko notes the considerable history of environmental security thinking, which figured in the landmark Brundtland Report (‘Our Common Future’, 1987) twenty years ago, including extensive discussions of energy, food security, and sustainable development in general (Dabelko, 2008). However, the Brundtland account of environmental security (and sustainable development) may be too conventional and insufficiently radical for current purposes, as the contemporaneous critiques and events of the intervening decades suggest. The present challenges require a more holistic 'ecological security' perspective for achieving climate security and energy security in a coordinated manner, reflecting an evolving morality-security relationship. Pirages and De Geest offer an ‘eco-evolutionary’ approach to environmental security, ‘to anticipate and analyze emerging demographic, ecological and technological discontinuities and dilemmas associated with rapid globalization’ (Pirages and De Geest, 2003), while Kütting highlights the distinctions between environmental security and ecological security, suggesting that ecological security addresses local environment/society relations rather than state-centric concerns with environmental threats – though she does argue that ecological security is still focussed on the issue of violence and conflict as security references, rather than inequality per se; an issue that development of the concept is addressing. She also notes Peluso and Watt’s (2001) political ecology critique of the concept of environmental security: ‘[their] ecological security approach combines structural political economy approaches with cultural and ecological studies’ (Kütting, 2007; 52-53). Among the conclusions Kütting arrives at is that the breadth and inclusiveness of ‘ecological security’ which gives it great qualitative and normative analytical power can also diffuse the meaning and reference of the concept. A broad concept, to be sure, and yet the breadth of ‘ecological security’ may provide the framework for research into narrower policy topics which is otherwise thrown into a competitive relationship. For each society, economy, or country, or collective actor (such as the EU), competing political and economic demands may undermine the attempt to address climate and energy security priorities in a coordinated, consistent, and complementary manner. It is already clear that energy and climate create a nexus that invokes long-term security concerns for major actors (Hart, 2007), but not so clear that they have been understood as interconnected strategic goals in a moral context. Achieving such strategic goals rests heavily on global cooperation and the success of any such endeavours would seem to rest in having a commonly accepted framework – such as ecological security – to underwrite agreement in principle and policy. Sayre identifies as the critical factor our choice of *values*: ‘we have a clear and urgent need to set aside the values of consumerism and to replace them with other values …’ (Sayre, 2007; Chapter 18). It is this underlying set of values that has not yet been seriously addressed in energy and climate security discussions, not least because it presents profound challenges to almost everything we currently do, and the way we do it. To meet such challenges it will be necessary to internalize an ecological understanding of human security in our moral, political, economic, and social systems and structures. Such an ecological understanding would encompass the widest scope of moral community. The emergence of ‘energy security’ and ‘climate security’ reflects an increased sense of urgency around these issues at the heart of state interests and the global political economy, and may yet represent the tipping point at which the remnants of denial and resistance are abandoned in favour of structural adjustments of the ecological kind. While practical issues (such as developing alternative portable fuels) may carry moral implications, the real normative weight of pursuing energy and climate security arises from the wider structural implications of securing a sustainable future. Viewing such developments as a moral turn allows us to appreciate that **a sense of insecurity can cause us to question our assumptions** and adjust our values, and that changing values can underwrite our **efforts to change everything else** – including the socio-political-economic structures that influence our practices. *Conclusions: more than instrumental adjustment* These recent climate and energy security terms reflect more than mere instrumental adjustment to practical challenges, within the framework of existing moral conceptions and commitments; that is, within the framework of the existing international system. Our attention should be turned to the systemic and structural implications of this shifting discourse, as it may reflect substantial underlying change. Furthermore, any opportunity to build on momentum or dynamics that would address the fundamental issues of energy and climate should be identified and capitalised on – while mere instrumental short-term adjustments may advantage some actors, it is of course necessary to go far beyond such superficial instrumentality and to appreciate the deeper significance of the energy-climate scenario. In viewing shifts in the security discourse as morally significant, we are better able to appreciate the structural consequences. In light of these evolving security concepts we should attempt the further development of an 'ecological security' concept as a holistic perspective of some practical and normative significance. This should be informed by an anti-foundational interpretation of the discourses in which these security terms are deployed, with no fixed assumptions about moral, political, economic or social points of reference – this is new territory, which demands open-mindedness. As Cerny (1990) concluded in respect of structure and agency, our inherited ideas are imperfect guides to the future, and a critical report on biofuels (Santa Barbara, 2007) concludes that energy security and climate change demand a new paradigm and cites Einstein: ‘We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them’. Oversimplification of the issues under convenient ‘security’ labels is risky – in doing this states signal high priority ‘national interests’ and the threat of extraordinary measures. However, a moral perspective on security could lead to even more extraordinary measures: global cooperation in the long-term pursuit of human interest, bringing urgency to what is obviously important. Thus some conformity around ecological values may yet help us cope with the challenges of energy and climate security.

#### No war impacts – warming discourse changes security discourse, not the other way around

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(Rafaela Rodrigues, A Climate for Conflict or Cooperation? Addressing the Securitisation of Climate Change, Paper prepared for the Third Global International Studies Conference, 17-20 August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal)

Trombetta, however, argues that the logic of security itself can change as new principles, actors, capabilities and threats gain relevance and different security discourses emerge (2011: 142). In line with this reasoning, Detraz and Betsill identify two different discourses of climate change and security and argue that each produces distinct understandings and yields unique policy recommendations (2009: 305). According to the authors, while the environmental conflict discourse is directly linked to traditional understandings of military and state security, the environmental security discourse is more closely linked to notions of human security in which the protection of human welfare is central (Detraz and Betsill, 2009: 306). According to this line of thought, linking climate change and security does not inevitably imply linking it to military security. In the EU, although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue by key actors, both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal environmental politics: adaptation and mitigation measures, with a commitment to climate research and international cooperation. What securitisation created was an increase sense of urgency attributed to climate change that is speeding the response to the issue (Brito, 2010: 48). Furthermore, there are no predictable signs that military responses to climate change will be formulated in a near future. This is not to say, however, that there is no role envisaged for the military in climate-security. In fact they are seen as key players in climate related crisis management and disaster response (High Representative for CFSP and the European Commission, 2008: 10). However, crisis response is but one component of EU action on climate change which attempts to combine prevention, mitigation, adaptation, and response to crisis (Council of the European Union, 2009: 3). The analysis of climate change politics in the EU suggests that Maria Julia Trombetta is correct when she argues that the securitisation of the environment is transforming existing security practices and provisions (Trombetta, 2008: 585). As Javier Solana argues, in the case of climate change, mitigation and adaptation should be seen as preventive security policies (Solana, 2008).